Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity by Gravel, Nicolas et al.
Uniform Expected Utility Criteria for Decision
Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity1
Nicolas Gravel2, Thierry Marchant3 and Arunava Sen4
March 8th 2012
JEL classication numbers: D80, D81.
1The authors are listed in alphabetic order and deserve equal credit and blame for the content
of the paper.
2Aix-Marseille University, School of Economics & GREQAM, Centre de la Vieille Charité,
2, rue de la Charité, 13 002 Marseille, France, nicolas.gravel@univ-amu.fr
3Ghent University, Department of Data analysis, H. Dunantlaan 1, B-9000 Gent, Belgium,
Thierry.Marchant@UGent.be
4Indian Statistical Institute, 7, Shaheed Jit Singh Marg, New Delhi, 11 0016 India,
asen@isid.ac.in.
Abstract
We provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of criteria for ranking completely
uncertain and/or ambiguous decisions. A completely uncertain decision is described by
the nite set of all its consequences. An ambiguous decisions is described as a nite
set of possible probability distributions over a nite set of prizes. Every criterion in the
characterized family can be thought of as assigning to every consequence (probability
distribution) of a decision an equal probability of occurrence and as comparing decisions
on the basis of the expected utility of their consequences (probability distributions) for
some utility function.
1 Introduction
Decision problems are typically categorized by features of the environment assumed to be
known to the decision maker. In situations of certainty, the decision maker is assumed to
know the unique consequence of every decision. In situations of risk, analyzed for instance
in Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1], every decision results in a probability distribution
over consequences that is assumed to be known to the decision maker. In situations of
uncertainty formalized in Savage [2], a decision or an act is a function from a set of states
of nature to a set of consequences. In situations of complete uncertainty or ignorance
as studied in the sizeable literature surveyed by [3], a decision is described even more
parsimoniously as the set of all its foreseeable consequences, without reference to states
of nature or to a process that maps states of nature into consequences. A hybrid category
of decision problems is provided by the recent literature on objective ambiguity without
state spaces ([4], [5]) where a decision is represented as a set of probability distributions
over a set of consequences. This paper is concerned with the two last categories of
decisions problems.
It may be useful to illustrate the di¤erent types of decision-making problems outlined
above. Imagine for this purpose an investor who has to choose between alternative
investment strategies that can yield one of three following outcomes: "gaining $100",
"losing $100", and "breaking even (or earning $0)". In the certainty case, each decision
leads to a unique consequence (e.g. "gaining $100 for sure", "losing $100 for sure", and
"breaking even for sure"). In the risk model considered by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1], each decision leads to a probability distribution over these outcomes. For instance
decision A could lead to either gaining $100 with probability one-half or losing $100
with probability one-half while decision B could lead to breaking even with probability
one. In the uncertainty model of Savage [2], one could imagine that there are "states
of nature" (for instance "High" and "Low" representing whether the stock-market index
is rising or falling). In such a setting, decision A is the map that associates $100 with
the state "High" and  $100 with the state "Low". Decision B is the constant map
that associates $0 with both states. In situations under ignorance, decision A would be
represented as the set f 100; 100g and decision B as the set f0g. The idea is that the
investor recognizes that if she chooses A, the outcome will be either $100 or  $100, but
she has no objective basis for assigning likelihoods to the occurrence of either outcome,
or for making the outcome depend upon the realization of a "state of nature".1 In such a
model, the decision maker has a ranking over all decisions, i.e. (nite) subsets of the sets
of consequences. Our objective is to provide axioms on the ranking of all such decisions
that characterize a class of rules that, we believe, is particularly salient.
As mentioned earlier, there is a large literature on the ranking of sets of objects. The
preponderance of rankings considered in this literature are based on the best and the worst
consequences of the decisions or on associated lexicographic extensions.2 There are two
obvious limitations of such extremistrankings for understanding decision-making under
ignorance. The rst is that it is natural to believe (in line with various expected utility
hypotheses) that decision makers are concerned with "averages" rather than "extremes".
For instance, suppose A = f$1; $1000000g while B = f$0; $900000; $900001; :::; $999999g.
Since the extreme values of A are strictly greater than those of B, extremistcriteria will
1A very good comparison of the "ignorance" and "uncertainty" setting is done in Pattanaik and Peleg
[6].
2Notable exceptions are [7] and [8].
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favor the former over the latter. However, a convincing case can be made for B over A on
the grounds that, on "average" a larger gain is likelier in the former. This is particularly
plausible because the decision maker is completely ignorant, i.e. has no model in her
mind regarding states of nature and mappings that associate consequences to states. A
second drawback of "extremist" rankings is that they do not allow for a diversity of
attitudes toward ignorance across decision makers. In situations where decisions have
only monetary consequences and all decision makers prefer more money to less, they
will all have identical rankings over decisions under positional rules such as maximin,
maximax, leximin and so on. This is unsatisfactory since the fact that decision makers
have the same preference over certain outcomes should not imply that they have the same
attitude toward ignorance.3
In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of criteria or
decision rules that address these criticisms. The criteria that we characterize are close
in spirit to the Expected Utility (EU) family ([1], [2]). They can be viewed as ranking
decisions (sets) on the basis of the expected utility of their consequences for some utility
function under the assumption that the decision maker assigns an equal probability of
occurrence to every consequence of a decision. For this reason we refer to a criterion
in this family as a Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion. In the context of the
example described earlier, there exist utility numbers for consequences $100, $0 and
 $100 denoted by u(100), u(0) and u( 100) respectively such that A is preferred to B
only if u( 100)+u(100)
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is greater than u(0). These rules are clearly based on averages
rather than extremes. Moreover, the function u expresses a decision makers attitude
towards ignorance.
Besides the framework of analysis, the main di¤erence between UEU criteria and stan-
dard EU ones in [2] lies in the uniformity of the probabilities that our axiomatic structure
implies. In our view, uniform probabilities are appropriate in the context of choice under
ignorance. A decision maker who ignores the mechanism by which consequences are pro-
duced from states of nature and one who is capable only of identifying the set of possible
consequences of a decision, has a priori no reason to believe that one consequence is
more likely than another. This principle of insu¢ cient reason, renamed the "principle of
indi¤erence" by Keynes [9], was the main justication given by early probability theorists
such as Bernoulli and Laplace, for their assumption of uniform probabilities in "games of
chance" (see also [10] for a recent justication of this principle). Our paper can therefore
also be seen as o¤ering an axiomatic characterization of this principle.
The main axioms used in our characterization are Averaging (rst introduced in [11])
and Restricted Independence. We provide the characterization in two alternative envi-
ronments. We rst consider a general environment in which no topological property is
assumed on the set of possible consequences of a decision. We only assume that the en-
vironment is minimally rich (in a sense dened and described in detail in section 2.2).
In this setting, we characterize the family of UEU criteria by Averaging, Restricted inde-
pendence and an Archimedean condition (in the terminology of Krantz, Luce, Suppes and
Tversky (KLST) [12]). This general result is then easily applied to a topological setting.
We do that in Theorem 3 that characterizes the UEU family in an environment where the
set of consequences is a connected separable topological space. Assuming such an envi-
ronment enables one to eliminate the Richness condition and to replace the Archimedean
property by a mild continuity condition on the ranking of decisions.
3The median-based rankings characterized in [8] are also subject to this di¢ culty although they avoid
the criticism of been based on extremevalues.
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We mentioned above that our results apply also to the literature on objective ambigu-
ity. In this literature, decision makers rank sets of lotteries over consequences (rather than
sets of consequences). These sets of lotteries are interpreted as describing ambiguous
decisions like those arising in the well-known Ellsberg paradox where the decision maker
does not know the particular probability distribution over a set of outcomes that is asso-
ciated with a given decision. In this setting, [4] characterizes a family of criteria which,
interpreted in the nite setting considered here, contains the UEU family as a particular
case.4 The analysis in [4] bears many formal similarities with the somewhat non-standard
Bolker-Je¤rey approach to decision making under uncertainty (see e.g. [13], [14], [15]; [16]
contains a good discussion of this approach). A common feature of [4], [13], [14] and [15]
is that they consider sets (other than singletons considered in [4] but excluded in the
others) that contain a continuum of elements. By contrast we limit attention to nite
sets of lotteries. This makes the two settings quite di¤erent and, among other things,
prevents one from viewing our main result as a particular case of theirs. We believe that
our nite subsets framework is an important one conceptually. It is, for instance, more
suitable for addressing the Ellsberg paradox where the ambiguity concerning the number
of balls in an urn is clearly of nite nature.
In addition, there are other environments where our model and results have a natural
interpretation. Consider for instance a situation where a jury member has to select one
of several possible candidates for a prize or an award (for instance, a lm for an Oscar).
The prize can be shared by several candidates. One can imagine the jury member ranking
all her possible options, in this case being the set of all non-empty subsets of candidates.
We believe that our axioms are very plausible in this setting in which case our results
will imply that the jurys members ranking will be a member of the UEU family. In
other words, she would have a utility numberassociated with each candidate. In order
to compare candidate sets A and B, she will compare the (symmetric) average utility
of the candidates in the two sets. This would appear to be a reasonable procedure. We
note that several papers ([17], [18],[19]) in mechanism design theory have investigated the
strategic behavior of agents who have preferences based on UEU criteria. In the situation
described above, imagine that there are several jury members who have to jointly make
the selection of the set of winners. Each jury member has an ordering which is a
member of the UEU family. However the utility function of each jury member is private
information and has to be revealed by each member. A social choice correspondence maps
tuples of utility function announcements to sets of winners. The goal of these papers is
to investigate the incentive properties of social choice correspondences. The UEU family
has also been considered by [20] in their analysis of Nash consistent representation of
e¤ectivity functions.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the
formal framework, the axioms and the family of rankings. The third section presents
the main results in the general algebraic setting while the fourth section derives them
in a topological environment. The fth section discusses some implications of the usual
notions of comparative uncertainty or ambiguity aversion for UEU criteria. The sixth
section comments on the independence of the axioms and the last section concludes.
4A related paper on objective ambiguity is [5].
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2 Notation and basic concepts
2.1 Notation
The sets of integers, non-negative integers, real numbers and non-negative real numbers
are denoted respectively by N, N+, R and R+. The cardinality of any set A is denoted
by #A and the k-fold Cartesian product of a set A with itself is denoted by Ak. By a
binary relation % on a set 
, we mean a subset of 
  
. Following the convention in
economics, we write x % y instead of (x; y) 2 %. Given a binary relation %, we dene its
symmetric factor  by x  y () x % y and y % x and its asymmetric factor  by x 
y () x % y and not (y % x). A binary relation % on 
 is reexive if the statement x
% x holds for every x in 
, is transitive if x % z always follows x % y and y % z for any
x, y, z 2 
 and is complete if x % y or y % x holds for every distinct x and y in 
. A
reexive, transitive and complete binary relation is called an ordering.
2.2 Basic concepts
Let X be the set of objects. To motivate the framework in terms of decision making under
ignorance, we will refer to these objects as possible "consequences" of a decision. In the
"objective ambiguity" interpretation of the model, these consequences will be lotteries
dened on a more fundamental space of consequences or "prizes". While we do not make
any specic assumptions on X, it will be clear subsequently that our axioms makes it
natural to regard this set as innite. As an example, one could think of X as being R,
interpreted as the set of all conceivable nancial returns (either negative or positive) of
some investment decision in a highly uncertain environment. As another (objective ambi-
guity) example, one could think of X as the set of all conceivable probability distributions
(lotteries) on a basic set of k di¤erent prizes.
We denote by P(X) the set of all non-empty nite subsets ofX (with generic elements
A, B, C, D, etc.). Any such subset is interpreted as a description of all consequences
of a completely uncertain decision or, simply, as a decision. A certain decision with
consequence x 2 X is identied by the singleton fxg.
Let % (with asymmetric and symmetric factors  and  respectively) be an ordering
on P(X). We interpret the statement A % B as meaning "decision with consequences
in A is weakly preferred to decision with consequences in B". A similar interpretation is
given to the statements A  B ("strictly preferred to") and A  B ("equivalent to"). For
any ordering % on P(X), we denote by %S the ordering of X induced by the restriction
of % to singletons (that is x %S x0 () fxg % fx0g).
We want to identify the properties (axioms) of the ordering % that are necessary and
su¢ cient for the existence of a function u : X ! R such that, for every A and B in P(X):











An ordering satisfying this property could therefore be thought of as resulting from the
comparisons of the expected utility of the consequences of the decision for some utility
function under the assumption that the decision maker assigns to every consequence of a
decision an equal probability of occurrence. We note that di¤erent utility functions u may
induce di¤erent rankings. We refer to any ranking that satises (1) for some function u
as to a Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion.
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We now introduce the three axioms that characterize the family of UEU criteria. The
rst of these axioms, called Averaging, is stated as follows.
Axiom 1 (Averaging) For all disjoint sets A and B 2 P(X), A % B , A % A [ B ,
A [B % B.
This axiom asserts that enlarging a set A with a (disjoint) set B is worth doing (resp.
not worth doing) if and only if the set B of added consequence is better (resp. worse) than
the set A to which it is added. It captures an intuitive property satised by calculations
of "average" in various settings (e.g. adding a student to a class will increase the average
of the class if and only if the grade of the added student is larger than the average of
the class). The "only if" part of the axiom is strong since it asserts that the only reason
for ranking a set B above (resp. below) a set A is when the addition of B to A is
considered a good (resp. bad) thing. The Averaging axiom is a compact version of the
four Averaging conditions AC1-AC4 discussed in [11] and shown by him to be implied by
the UEU family of criteria (as well as by a variant of the additivity axiom of [21], [22] and
[23]). The Averaging axiom has been used also in [7] for a characterization of the average
Borda ranking of sets as well as by [4] and [13] (see also [14]) in their characterizations
for ranking atomless subsets of a universe. A weaker version of Averaging (that only
requires the "if" part in its statement) is used in [5]. It is also used in [24] for ranking
menus of alternatives in a way that reects temptation and self-control.
It is also worth mentioning that the Averaging axiom implies the Gärdenfors [25] prin-
ciple discussed at length in the literature on ignorance as surveyed in [3]. The Gärdenfors
principle can be stated formally as follows.
Condition 1 (Gärdenfors Principle) For all A 2 P(X), (x 2 XnA and fxg  fag for
all a 2 A)) A [ fxg  A and (y 2 XnA and fag  fyg for all a 2 A)) A  A [ fyg.
This principle says that it is always (resp. never) worth adding to a set a consequence
which, if certain, is better (resp. worse) than all consequences in the set. For future refer-
ence we record (without proof) in the following proposition, the fact that the Averaging
axiom implies the Gärdenfors principle when applied to a transitive ranking of P(X).
Proposition 1 Let % be a transitive binary relation on P(X) that satises Averaging.
Then % satises the Gärdenfors principle.
The second axiom that enters into the characterization of the family of UEU rankings
is the following Restricted Independence axiom.
Axiom 2 (Restricted Independence) For all A, B and C 2 P(X) satisfying #A = #B
and A \ C = B \ C = ;, A % B , A [ C % B [ C.
This axiom requires that the ranking of sets with the same number of elements be
independent of any elements that they have in common. Adding or subtracting these
common elements from the two sets should not a¤ect their ranking. A weak form of
the Restricted Independence condition, applied only to the case where A and B are
singletons, plays an important role in [26] and [27]. It is worth noticing that the scope of
this independence axiom is signicantly restricted by the fact that it applies only to sets
that have the same number of elements.
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The third and nal axiom in our characterization is the following one that we call
"Archimedean" since it is similar in spirit to axioms of that name discussed in KLST
[12].
Axiom 3 (Archimedean) Let a; b 2 X be such that fag  fbg. Consider a sequence of
consequences fcig, i = 1; 2; ::: such that either fci; ag  fci+1; bg for all i; i + 1 with
i = 1; 2; ::: or fci+1; ag  fci; bg for all i; i+1 with i = 1; 2; ::: holds. Assume further that
all elements of the sequence are distinct from a and b. If the sequence is strictly bounded
by x and y 2 X in the sense that fxg  fcig  fyg for every i, then the sequence must
be nite.
While appearing involved, this axiom is quite simple. Consider two consequences a
and b where a is strictly better than b. Imagine now that the decision maker is indi¤erent
between a decision leading to either a or some consequence c1 and a decision leading to
either b or to some consequence c2. Intuitively, for such an indi¤erence to arise, c2 (added
to the bad consequence b) must be better than c1 (added to the good consequence a).
Imagine also that the decision maker is indi¤erent between decisions fa; c2g and fb; c3g
for some other consequence c3. Again such an indi¤erence suggests that c3 is better than
c2. When combined with the previous indi¤erence (e.g. between fa; c1g and fb; c2g), this
indi¤erence also suggests that c1 and c2 on the one hand and c2 and c3 on the other are
"equally spaced" in the preference ordering of the decision maker. Indeed both c1 and c2
and c2 and c3 "calibrate" the decision makers preference for a over b. Suppose now that
one can construct a sequence of arbitrary length (nite or not) of consequences like that
(e.g. c1; c2; c3; :::) that are increasing (or decreasing) and "equally spaced" in this sense.
The axiom requires that if the sequence formed by these consequences is innite, then it
can not be bounded. Such a property would be satised if the objects were real numbers
since any innite and monotonic sequence of equidistant real numbers is unbounded. This
axiom can be considered to be mild since it "bites" only when there exist sequences of the
type described above (such sequences are called "standard sequences" in the measurement
theory literature). The axiom is trivially satised if X is a nite set. In the next section,
we will show that this axiom can be replaced by a continuity condition if a topological
structure is imposed on X.
We now formally state that these three axioms are satised by any UEU criterion.
Proposition 2 Any UEU criterion satises Averaging, Restricted Independence and the
Archimedean axiom.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that a UEU criterion satises Averaging and
Restricted Independence. To prove that it satises the Archimedean axiom, let % on P (X)
be a UEU criterion and consider a sequence of consequences fcig for i = 1; 2; ::: such that,
for some consequences a and b distinct from every element in the sequence satisfying
fag  fbg, one has, say, fci; ag  fci+1; bg for all i = 1; 2; :::(the argument is similar if
fci+1; ag  fci; bg for all i = 1; 2; :::). Since % is a UEU criterion, there exists a function
u : X ! R such that u(a) > u(b) and u(ci) + u(a) = u(ci+1) + u(b) , u(a)   u(b) =
u(ci+1)  u(ci) for all i. Assume that the sequence is strictly bounded by x and y 2 X so
that fxg  fcig  fyg for all i. Since % is a UEU criterion, we have u(x) > u(ci) > u(y).
Dene the numbers ui by ui = u(ci) and d by d = u(a)  u(b) > 0. We therefore have a
sequence of numbers ui, i = 1; ::) such that ui = (i  1)d+u1 > u(y) for every i for some
strictly positive real number d. Clearly one can only have u(x) > (i  1)d+ u1 for all i of
the increasing sequence f(i  1)d+ u1g only if the sequence is nite.
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We will show that Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean axiom
characterize the family of UEU rankings of sets if some structure is imposed on the
environment. We provide this structure by imposing another axiom on the pair hX;%i.
This axiom imposes richness and smoothness on both the set X of alternatives and the
ordering %. However this axiom is not specically tailored to UEU criteria and may
be violated by these criteria if the set X of alternatives is sparse. Theorem 3 below
establishes that the axiom can be dispensed with ifX is taken to be a connected separable
topological space. The formal statement of the Richness axiom is as follows.
Axiom 4 (Richness) For every set B 2 P(X)  Xand every nite (possibly empty)
subset A of X, if there exist c; c 2 X such that A [ fcg % B % A [ fcg, then there
exists c 2 X such that A [ fcg  B.
This axiom states that the universe is su¢ ciently rich to enable, by adding single
consequences to sets, various kinds of comparisons with the ordering %. Suppose that,
starting with decision B and some (possibly empty) set A, it is possible to add conse-
quences c and c to A in such a way that A enlarged with c is ranked above B and A
enlarged with c is ranked below B. Then it must also be possible to add a consequence c
to A such that the resulting set of consequences is indi¤erent to A. The axiom is weak in
the sense that the asserted existence of the consequence c is contingent upon the existence
of consequences c and c that have the required properties.
We emphasize that Richness applies also if the set A to which the consequences c,
c and c are added is empty. Because of this, the axiom implies, in conjunction with the
Gardenförs principle, that every decision has a certainty equivalent. Put di¤erently, an
ordering that satises Averaging and Richness has the property that every decision has
an equivalent certain decision (a singleton). For further reference, we formally state
this Certainty Equivalencecondition and the fact that it is implied by Richness if the
ranking satises Averaging as follows.
Condition 2 (Certainty Equivalence) For every B 2 P(X), there exists b 2 X such that
fbg  B.
Proposition 3 Let % be an ordering on P(X) satisfying Averaging and Richness. Then
% satises the Certainty Equivalence condition.
Proof. Let B be any set in P (X). Because B is non-empty and nite and % is an
ordering on P (X), there exists c; c 2 B (not necessarily distinct) such that fcg % fbg
for all b 2 B and fbg % fcg for all b 2 B. By Averaging we have fcg % B % fcg which
can be written equivalently as ?[ fcg % B % ?[ fcg. By Richness (for A = ?), there
exists c such that fcg [?  B, which proves Certainty Equivalence.
It is also important to note that the combination of the Richness and Averaging axioms
implies that either the ranking % is trivial or that there are innitely many consequences
in X. Specically, if X is nite, then a decision maker who compares decisions in P(X)
with an ordering satisfying Averaging and Richness (and therefore Certainty Equivalence,
due to Proposition 3) must be indi¤erent between all decisions. We state this formally as
follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose #X = n for some n 2 N+ and let % be an ordering on P(X)
satisfying Averaging. Then % satises Certainty Equivalence if and only if A  B for all
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A;B 2 P(X).
Proof. It is clear that the trivial ordering dened by A  B for all A; B 2 P (X)
satises Certainty Equivalence (as well as Averaging). To prove the reverse implication,
write the nite set X as X = fx1; :::; xng and assume without loss of generality (since %
is an ordering) that fxig % fxi+1g for i = 1; :::; n   1. By Averaging, we must have, for
every i = 1; :::; n  1:
fxig % fxi; xi+1g % fxi+1g
By certainty equivalence there exists x(i) 2 X such that x(i)  fxi; xi+1g. Either fx(i)g %
fxig or fxi+1g % fx(i)g. In the rst case, one has fxi; xi+1g  fx(i)g % fxig so that, by
Averaging and transitivity, fxig  fxi+1g. In the other case, one has fxi+1g % fx(i)g 
fxi; xi+1g so that, again, the conclusion fxig  fxi+1g follows from Averaging and tran-
sitivity. Hence all pairs and singletons must be indi¤erent. Repeated application of Aver-
aging (adding rst indi¤erent singletons to pairs and then indi¤erent singletons to triples
etc.) leads to the conclusion of universal indi¤erence.
We note in passing that the trivial ordering that considers all sets to be indi¤erent is
a member of the UEU family (any constant function u having X as domain could serve
as a representation as per (1)). Hence, in the rest of the paper, we shall be interested in
characterizing the UEU family of orderings of P(X) in the non trivial case where there
are at least two sets A and B such A  B.
Beside forcing X to be innite or % to be trivial (when combined with Averaging),
the Richness axiom precludes from consideration some discontinuousrankings such as
the "Leximin" and the "Leximax" rules studied in [6]. For instance, the Leximin rule
compares sets on the basis of their worst consequences. If a tie in the worst consequence
arises, then the second worst consequence is considered and so on until either a strict
ranking is obtained or the consequences in at least one of the sets are exhausted. In the
latter case the set which contains the largest number of elements is ranked higher. Such
a rule violates Richness. Indeed if we take X = R+ one has that f1; 3g  f2g  f2; 3g
for the Leximin criterion. Yet, contrary to what is required by Richness, it is impossible
to nd a non-negative real number x such that fxg [ f3g  f2g.
It should be also noted that the Richness axiom is not specically related to the UEU
family and may even be violated by a UEU criterion if the set X is not su¢ ciently rich.





= 5:5 < 2+6+10
3
= 6, we have f2; 6; 7g  f5; 6g  f2; 6; 10g. Yet, contrary to what





does not exist a consequence c such that f2; 6; cg  f5; 6g.
3 Main results
The main result proved in this paper is the following.
Theorem 1 Let % be a non-trivial ordering on P(X) satisfying Richness. Then % sat-
ises Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean axiom if and only if it is
a UEU criterion. Furthermore, the u function in the denition of a UEU criterion is
unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation.
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The general logic underlying the proof of this result, detailed in the Appendix, is as
follows.
First, we establish the result on a subdomain of P(X) consisting of all nite subsets
of X that exclude minimal and maximal (with respect to %S) elements of the universe
(if any). Let us denote by X 0 this set and by P(X 0) the set of all nite subsets of X 0
(the formal denitions of these is done in the Appendix). After having obtained that
any ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence, the Archimedean
axiom and Richness can be represented as per (1) for some function u : X 0 ! R, we then
show that this numerical representation can be extendedto the whole set P(X).
The proof of the restricted version of Theorem 1 on P(X 0) is made of two main steps.
In the rst, we show that Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean
axiom characterize the family of UEU criteria in an environment satisfying Richness if
one restricts attention to subsets of X 0 that have at most two consequences. The proof of
this result, also provided in the Appendix, critically rests on Theorem 2 of KLST [12] (p.
257) on additively separable numerical representations of an ordering over a Cartesian
product X  X (see also [28] or [29] for an earlier statement framed in a topological
setting). An important ingredient in the proof is the demonstration that the ranking
of the Cartesian product X  X induced by % in our axiomatic structure, satises the
so-called Thomsen condition (see KLST [12], Denition 3, p. 250). This is shown in
Lemma 2 of the Appendix.
The characterization result for decisions involving at most two distinct consequences
that is proved in the Appendix is the following.
Theorem 2 Let % be a non-trivial ordering on P(X) satisfying Richness. Then, if %
satises Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean axiom, its restriction
to the sets in P(X 0) of cardinality no larger than 2 can be represented as per (1) for
some utility function u : X 0  ! R. Furthermore, the utility function u is unique up to a
positive a¢ ne transformation.
The second step extends Theorem 2 to subsets of X 0 with an arbitrary (but nite)
number of consequences using the same axioms. Specically, we prove in the Appendix
that the unique utility function whose expectation (under uniform probabilities) repre-
sents the ranking of sets containing at most two elements exhibited in Theorem 2 also
represents the ranking of sets of larger cardinality. A key step in the argument is the
technical Lemma 4, stated and proved in Appendix, that enables one to approximate the
arithmetic mean of a set of n numbers recursively from the arithmetic means of pairs of
those numbers.
Using this lemma, we show in the Appendix that the evaluation of any decision
involving more than two consequences can be made on the basis of formula (1) if the
evaluation of all decisions involving at most two consequences can be made on that basis.
The argument works iteratively by "squeezing" the certainty equivalent of any decision A
having more than two consequences between successive pairs (one above and one below)
of decisions, each with two consequences. These two consequences are either an element
of A or the certainty equivalent of a previous decision in the sequence. The successive
pairs of decisions with two consequences can be evaluated by (1) thanks to Theorem
2 and they are constructed in such a way that their average utilities behave just like
the sequences of arithmetic means of two numbers studied in Lemma 4. Thanks to this
lemma, we can then know that the utility of the certainty equivalent of A is equal to
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the average utility of the elements in A. We can therefore use this average utility to
numerically represent the ordering % on all nite subsets of X 0, giving us the required
restricted version of Theorem 1 (called Theorem 4 in the Appendix).
The nal step of the proof consists in showing that the numerical representation of %
restricted to P(X 0) of Theorem 4 can be extended to the whole set P(X) so as to give
Theorem 1.
3.1 Related literature
There are two papers that are immediately related to ours. The rst is [11] which char-
acterizes the UEU family of rankings of all non-empty subsets of a nite universe. The
model does not impose any restriction on the environment. As a result, the characteriza-
tion is a direct adaptation of the additivity axiom of [21], [22] and [23]. The unappealing
nature of this axiom is well-known and is especially striking when adapted to the prob-
lem of comparing sets on the basis of their average utility. The additivity axiom involves
the construction of arbitrarily long sequences of set comparisons which are both di¢ cult
to motivate as primitive axioms as well as hard to verify in practice. By contrast, the
structure of our model enables us to characterize the UEU family of rankings of sets by
means of axioms that are, in our opinion, easier to interpret and verify. We note that
our Averaging axiom is identied in [11] as being satised by any ranking in the UEU
family. Our contribution is to show that in conjunction with Restricted Independence
and the Archimedean axiom, Averaging characterizes the UEU family in a su¢ ciently
rich environment.
The other related paper is [7]. It provides a characterization of a ranking of nite sets
based on the average Borda score of their elements. This ranking is clearly a member
of the UEU family for which the utility of a consequence is dened by its Borda score.
Our paper, in contrast provides a characterization of the entire family of UEU criteria.
Like [11], [7] uses the Averaging axiom (along with several others) but do not use an
Archimedean axiom or any richness condition.
4 Topological interpretation of the structural envi-
ronment
We show in this section that if we impose a topological structure on the setX from the out-
set, then the Richness axiom can be dispensed with entirely. Moreover, the Archimedean
axiom can be replaced by a mild continuity one in the characterization. This shows that
the algebraic structure considered in the previous section is more general for the purpose
at hand than the standard topological structure assumed in many decision problems (see
e.g. [30] for similar ndings in a di¤erent context).
Assume specically that X is a connected subset of a separable topological space.5 At
least two interpretations could be given to X in this context. First, X could be thought
of as the set of all bundles of k goods that could result from any uncertain decision . Here
it would be natural to take X = Rk interpreting it as all bundles of goods. The case of
5A subset A of a topological space is connected if it can not be written as a nite union of pairwise
disjoint open sets. A topological space S is separable if it contains a countable subset the closure of which
is S.
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k = 1 could be interpreted as the special case of decisions with monetary consequences
that we have discussed earlier.
The second interpretation, in line with the literature on objective ambiguity (see e.g.
[4] or [5]) is to view X as the set of all lotteries yielding k di¤erent prizes. A typical
element p 2 X is a probability vector assigning to every prize h (for h = 1; :::; k) its
probability of realization ph 2 [0; 1]. A nite set A  X of such probability vectors is then
an ambiguous decision in which the precise probability distribution over the set of k prizes
is not known to the decision maker. A classical instance of decision making under this kind
of ambiguity is provided by the so-called Ellsberg paradox in which a decision maker does
not know how a certain number of balls are split between two colors (see [5] for further
discussion). If this interpretation is favored, thenX = Sk 1 = fp 2 [0; 1]k :Pkj=1 pj = 1g.
6
For either of these interpretations, we believe that it is natural to impose the following
Continuity axiom on %.
Axiom 5 (Continuity) For all A 2 P(X), the sets B(A) = fx 2 X : fxg % Ag and
W (A) = fx 2 X : A  fxgg are closed in X.
According to the axiom, a small change in a consequence (lottery) should not have a
drastic e¤ect on the ranking of this consequence (lottery) vis-à-vis any set. We emphasize
that our Continuity axiom only concerns comparisons of sets vis-à-vis singletons. It is
therefore much weaker than the (Vietoris) continuity condition used for instance in [26]
which restricts the comparisons of two sets in a way that is not even compatible with the
UEU family of set rankings. It is clear that any UEU criterion for which the associated
u function is continuous, satises this axiom.
The result in this section establishes that the UEU family is characterized by Aver-
aging, Restricted Independence and Continuity in this environment. In view of Theorem
1, we only need to prove that, if X is a connected subset of separable topological space,
then an ordering that satises Continuity, Averaging and Restricted Independence also
satises the Richness and the Archimedean axioms.
Theorem 3 Let X be a connected subset of a separable topological space and let % be an
ordering of P(X). Then % satises Continuity, Averaging and Restricted Independence
if and only if it is a UEU criterion for which the function u is continuous.
As before, the proof of Theorem 3 is provided in the Appendix. Below, we make some
remarks about the literature related to the ranking of subsets of some topological spaces.
4.1 Related Literature
A paper using a topological framework but arriving at strikingly di¤erent results is [26].
This paper characterizes rankings that compare sets on the basis of their maximal and
minimal elements using Hausdor¤ continuity and a mild independence condition. Our
UEU criteria satisfy the independence condition but violate Hausdor¤ continuity. Con-
tinuity is not a straightforward notion when applied to a ranking of sets of objects (as
opposed to a ranking of objects). We believe that our notion of continuity is very natural
and that of Hausdor¤ continuity rather restrictive. For instance, it seems very persuasive
6Here Sk 1 is the unit simplex of dimension k   1.
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to regard members of the UEU family (dened with respect to a continuous function u)
as being continuous.
As mentioned in the Introduction, UEU type criteria have also been considered in
the literature on decision under objective ambiguity. For instance, [4] (see also [13])
characterizes all rankings of the following kind: for all sets A and B in the domain,











for some function u and some probability measure  dened on an algebra of atomless
subsets of X. The UEU family could be considered to be a sub-family of this class of
orderings if the measure  could be taken to be the cardinality of the sets. Yet, [4] and
[13] exclude nite sets from their domain, while we do not consider non-nite sets. Hence
our results are completely independent from theirs. As we mentioned earlier, we believe
that the nite setting in which we obtain our characterization is a clear advantage of our
approach, notably with respect to possible empirical or experimental verication. It is,
indeed, rather di¢ cult to construct experimental settings in which a decision maker is
confronted with decisions with a continuum of consequences.
5 Comparative ambiguity/uncertainty aversion
Ambiguity aversion is sometimes perceived as the main reason for the preference pat-
tern observed in the so-called Ellsberg paradox and uncertainty aversion can be seen
as lying behind the so-called "precautionary principle" in public decision making. It is
therefore of some interest to have an easy diagnostic tool for appraising the degree of
uncertainty/ambiguity aversion of a decision maker placed in an ambiguous or radically
uncertain environment. We now briey show that such a diagnostic is particularly easy
for UEU criteria.
We start with the following denition of what it means for a binary relation %1 to
exhibit at least as much uncertainty/ambiguity aversion as a binary relation %2 (see also
[4] and [5] for similar denitions in the specic context of decision making under objective
ambiguity).
Denition 1 Comparative ambiguity/uncertainty aversion. Given two binary relations
%1 and %2 dened on P(X), we say that %1 is at least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as
%2 if, for every consequence x 2 X and any decision A 2 P(X), fxg %2 A) fxg %1 A
and fxg 2 A) fxg 1 A.
In words, a decision maker with preference %1 is at least as uncertainty/ambiguity
averse as a decision maker with preference %2 if it is the case that whenever the latter
prefers (weakly or strictly) a certain (non-ambiguous) decision to some other decision,
then so does the former. The following proposition, whose easy proof is provided in the
Appendix, establishes the implication of this denition in the case of two decision makers
with UEU preferences.
Proposition 5 Let %1 and %2 be two orderings on P(X) which can be represented as
per (1) for some functions u1 and u2 respectively (both having X as domain and R as
range). Then %1 is at least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as %2 as per denition 1 if
and only if there exists some increasing and concave function 	 having the image of R
under u2 as domain and R as range such that u1(x) = 	(u2(x)).
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According to Proposition 5, the statement is at least as uncertainty/ambiguity averse
as in the class of UEU orderings is equivalent to the statement has a weakly more
concave utility function than. This is clearly the counterpart of increasing risk aversion
in the standard vNM theory of choice under risk (see for instance, Chapter 6 in [31]).
We conclude this section by mentioning an implication of this discussion for the in-
terpretation of our model in terms of decision making under objective ambiguity, when
the decision maker can be assumed to have conventional VNM preferences over lotter-
ies. Suppose therefore that X = Sk 1 and that, in addition to the axioms considered
in the previous section, we impose on the binary relation % the following Singleton
Independenceaxiom.
Axiom 6 Singleton Independence. For every p, q and r 2 Sk 1 and every number
 2 [0; 1], fpg % fq)() fp+ (1  )rg % fq + (1  )rg.
The following Proposition which restricts the function u that represents UEU ranking
in (1) to be additively separable between probabilities, can then be obtained as a corollary
of Theorem 3 and standard textbook versions of the Expected Utility Theorem (see e.g.
Proposition 6.B.3 in [31]).
Proposition 6 Let % be an ordering on P(Sk 1). Then % satises Averaging, Restricted
Independence, Singleton Independence and Continuity if and only if there exists some
increasing function  : R! R and some vector v 2 Rk such that
















Hence the interpretation of the UEU family of rankings in the context of choice under
objective ambiguity enables one, at least in the context of standard vNM theory, to
disconnect the attitude toward risk and the attitude toward ambiguity. The attitude
toward risk is captured by the functional relation that exists between the numbers v1; :::vk
in Proposition 6 and the prizes to which they correspond. As established by Proposition
5, attitude toward ambiguity is captured by the degree of concavity of the function 
that aggregates vNM individual utility numbers v1; :::; vk into the u function.
6 Independence of the axioms
We show that Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean axioms are
logically independent when they are imposed on an ordering that satises Richness. Since
any UEU criterion satises Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean
axiom, it can therefore be said that these three axioms provide a minimal characterization
of the UEU family of orderings in any environment where these orderings satisfy Richness.
It is clear that these examples can also be used to show the logical independence of
Averaging, Restricted Independence and Continuity whenX is assumed to be a connected
subset of a separable topological space.
Example 1 Let X = R+. For all A; B 2 P (X),








It can be checked easily that this (Cardinality) ranking satises Restricted Independence,
the Archimedean axiom, Continuity and Richness but violates Averaging. Indeed, f3g %
f1; 2g but f3g  f1; 2; 3g.
Example 2 Let X = R++ and dene % by:















This ordering satises the Averaging axiom. It is a continuous ordering because the set














 x2g are closed for any
set A 2 P (X). Moreover it can be seen that it satises the Archimedean axiom using
an argument that parallels that of Proposition 2. Yet % violates Restricted Independence
because if we take
A = f1; 7g, B = f2; 3g and C = f4; 12g









but, contrary to what is required by Restricted Independence, we have A [ C  B [ C
since:
























Example 3 Let X = R  R. For any a 2 X and i 2 f1; 2g, let ai denote the i-th
component of a. Dene the ordering % by:























































The ordering is a lexicographic combination of two UEU orderings dened on each
dimension. We rst prove that it violates the Archimedean axiom. The set f(2; i) : i 2 Zg
is a standard sequence because f(2; i); (1; 2)g  f(2; i + 1); (1; 1)g for all i 2 Z. This
standard sequence is innite but is bounded. Indeed, for any i 2 N , we have f(3; 1)g 
f(2; i)g  f(1; 1)g. The ordering can also be veried to violate continuity.
We now show that % satises Averaging. Suppose rst that A  B. Using the deni-



































































A  A [B:
A similar reasoning holds when A  B. To show that % satises Richness, consider
























We then have A [ fcg  B. We notice that this conclusion holds no matter what is
assumed on the ranking of A vis-à-vis B. Hence this conclusion can also be obtained for
sets B and A that satisfy the requirements of the Richness axiom.
Finally, to show that % satises Restricted Independence, consider nite and non-
empty subsets A and B of X such that #A = #B and some nite and non-empty set C














































































A [ C  B [ C:
A similar reasoning holds when A  B.
7 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the family of UEU rankings of decisions under ignorance or
objective ambiguity under the assumption that the rankings are dened in a rich envi-
ronment. The axioms used are easy to interpret and, except perhaps for continuity or
the Archimedean axiom, are veriable from observation of choice behavior. We have also
shown that UEU rankings can be used to compare ambiguous decisions or decisions with
nancial consequences and is characterized in these setting by the same axioms but with
the Archimedean axiom replaced by a mild Continuity requirement. The framework can
also be used to provide an analysis of comparative attitudes toward radical uncertainty
or toward ambiguity.
A limitation of UEU criteria is that they assign to every consequence of a decision
the same probability of occurrence. A next step in the research agenda is to identify
the properties of a more general EU criterion that does not impose this assumption. A
natural candidate would be the nite counterpart of the family of orderings described
by (2). Members of this family satisfy Averaging and Continuity (or the Archimedean
axiom) but, as illustrated in example 2 in section 6, may violate Restricted Independence.
Obtaining a satisfactory characterization of this class of rankings in a nite setting strikes
us as a high priority for future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Dene the (possibly empty) sets m(X) and M(X) of minimal and maximal (respectively)
elements of X with respect to %S by:
m(X) = fx 2 X : fxg - fyg 8 y 2 Xg and
M(X) = fz 2 X : fzg % fyg 8 y 2 Xg
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Let X 0 be dened by X 0 = Xn(m(X) [M(X)). We rst show that, under our assumptions,
the set X 0 is "unbounded" in the sense that for any x 2 X 0, we can nd some consequences w
and z 2 X 0 such that fwg  fxg  fzg. We state and prove this result formally as follows.
Proposition 7 Let % be a non-trivial ordering on P(X) satisfying Richness and Averaging.
Then, X 0 6= ; and for all x 2 X 0, there exist w; z 2 X 0 such that fwg  fxg  fzg.
Proof. Since % is non-trivial, there exist A;B 2 P(X) such that A  B. Consider any
x 2 X 0. By Proposition 3, the ordering % satises Certainty Equivalence. Therefore, there
exist a; b 2 X such that A  fag and B  fbg. By Averaging, fag  fa; bg  fbg. By
Certainty Equivalence, there exists a c 2 X such that fcg  fa; bg. Clearly, c 2 X 0. We now
nd w 2 X 0 such that fwg  fxg. Suppose rst that m(X) = ;. This means that x =2 m(X)
so that there exists some t 2 X such that ftg  fxg. By Certainty Equivalence, there exists
some w 2 X such that fwg  ft; xg. By Averaging and transitivity, fxg  fwg  ftg.
Hence w =2 m(X) [M(x) so that w 2 X 0. Suppose now that m(X) 6= ; and let t 2 m(X).
By denition of m(X), we have ftg  fxg so that, by Certainty Equivalence again, there
exists some w such that fwg  ft; xg. As before, we can conclude from Averaging that
ftg  fwg  fxg so that w 2 Xn(m(X) [M(X)), as required. The argument for nding
some z 2 X 0 such that fzg  fxg is similar.
Before proving Theorems 2 and 4 on the sub-domain P(X 0), we must verify that all our
axioms - formulated for the domain P(X)- are also valid for the sub-domain P(X 0).We do this
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let % be an ordering on P(X) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence,
Richness and the Archimedean axiom. Then the restriction of % to P(X 0) satises the same
axioms.
Proof. It is easy to verify that this is indeed the case for Averaging, Restricted Inde-
pendence and the Archimedean axiom. For Richness, let A and B be two nite subsets of
X 0 (with A possibly empty) and assume that there are consequences c and c 2 X 0 such
that A [ fcg % B % A [ fcg. By Richness (applied to P(X)), there exists a consequence
c 2 X such that A [ fcg  B. We need to show that c 2 X 0. By contradiction, assume
c 2 XnX 0 = m(X) [ M(X). If c 2 m(X), then fcg  fxg for all x 2 X 0 so that, in
particular, fcg  fcg and fcg  fag for all a 2 A. Hence c =2 A. One has therefore, by
Restricted Independence (if c =2 A) or by Averaging (if c 2 A), that B % A[fcg  A[fcg,
a contradiction (if % is transitive). The argument is symmetric if c 2M(X).
An important ingredient in the proof of Theorem 2 is the following lemma, which states
that if an ordering % on P(X 0) satises Averaging, Restricted Independence, Richness and
the Archimedean axiom, then it satises, when restricted to pairs and singletons, the following
important condition that is closely related to the so-called Thomsen conditionin the theory
of conjoint measurement (using KLST [12] terminology).
Lemma 2 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence,
Richness and the Archimedean axiom. Then for every (not necessarily distinct) consequences
a, b, c, d, e and f 2 X 0, fag [ ffg  fcg [ feg and fcg [ fdg  fbg [ ffg must imply
fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg.
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Proof. We consider several cases.
1. fag  fbg and fdg  feg . In this case, we conclude that fag [ fdg  fbg [ fdg by
Restricted Independence if both a 6= d and b 6= d. If either a = d and b 6= d or a 6= d
and b = d, the conclusion fag [ fdg  fbg [ fdg follows from Averaging. Finally, if
a = d and b = d, the conclusion that fag [ fdg  fbg [ fdg follows trivially from the
assumption that fag  fbg. By an analogous reasoning we can obtain the conclusion
that fbg [ fdg  fbg [ feg. The conclusion that fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg follows then at
once from transitivity.
2. fag  fbg and fdg % feg. In this case, it follows from Restricted Independence (if a 6=
f 6= b) or Averaging (if a = f or b = f) that fag [ ffg  fbg [ ffg. Analogously, we
can conclude from the premises of this case that fcg[fdg % fcg[feg (using Restricted
Independence if d 6= c 6= e and Averaging if d = c or e = c). It then follows from
transitivity that fcg [ fdg % fcg [ feg  fag [ ffg  fbg [ ffg  fcg [ fdg. Since
this is a contradiction, we conclude that this case is impossible.
3. fag  fbg and fdg - feg. This case can also shown to be impossible, following a similar
reasoning as for case 2.
4. fag  fbg and fdg % feg. We then consider several subcases.
(i) c = f . Since fag [ ffg  fcg [ feg, we conclude that fag  feg using Restricted
Independence (if a 6= f and c 6= e), Averaging (if a = f and c 6= e or a 6= f and
c = e) or trivially (if a = f and c = e). By an analogous reasoning, we conclude from
fcg[fdg  fbg[ffg that fbg  fdg. Hence, we have fag  feg and fbg  fdg. This
implies that fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg by Restricted Independence (if a 6= d and b 6= e) or
by Averaging (in all other cases).
(ii) Suppose f 6= c, e 6= c 6= d, d 6= a 6= fand e 6= b 6= f . We rst establish that
there are u and v 2 X 0 such that fug [ fvg \ fag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg = ;
and fa; ug  fc; vg. Suppose rst fag  fcg. Take then any u 2 X 0n(fag [ fbg [
fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg) (the existence of such a u is secured by Proposition 7) and
dene v = u. We then immediately obtain fa; ug  fc; vg by Restricted Independence.
Suppose now that fag  fcg. By Proposition 7 there is a v 2 X 0 such that fvg  fag.
By Restricted Independence, one has fa; vg  fc; vg and fc; vg  fc; ag and, by
transitivity, fa; vg  fc; vg  fa; cg. It follows from Richness that there is a u 2 X 0 such
that fag [ fug  fc; vg. If fu; vg \ fa; b; f; c; d; eg 6= ;, one can repeat this procedure,
starting with another v. The repetition of the procedure will be nite because the set
fag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg is nite. Hence there exist u; v 2 X 0nfag [ fbg [
fcg[fdg[feg[ffg such that fa; ug  fc; vg. Using an analogous argument, one can
obtain a similar conclusion if fag  fcg is assumed. Now, by Restricted Independence,
one has fc; f; vg  fa; f; ug and fa; f; ug  fc; e; ug. It follows from transitivity that
fc; f; vg  fc; e; ug so that ff; vg  fe; ug must hold by Restricted Independence.
Using Restricted Independence again, we obtain from fa; ug  fc; vg that fa; d; ug 
fc; d; vg and from fc; dg  fb; fg that fc; d; vg  fb; f; vg  fb; e; ug. It follows from
transitivity that fa; d; ug  fb; e; ug and, by Restricted Independence, fa; dg  fb; eg.
(iii) Suppose c 6= f , e 6= c 6= d, and e 6= b 6= f . The only di¤erence with subcase
(ii) is that we relax the constraint d 6= a 6= f. Hence this case is more general than
18
(ii). Suppose, contrary to the asserted implication of the Lemma, that fag [ fdg 6
fbg [ feg. Since % is complete, two symmetric cases can arise: fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg
or fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg. We only handle the rst one. We rst show that we can
nd distinct a0 and f 0 2 X 0nfag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg such that fa0g  fag,
ffg  ff 0g and fa0; f 0g  fag [ ffg. The existence of a0 2 X 0 such that fa0g  fag
is secured by Proposition 7. Assume rst a = f . Either fa0; gg  fag for all g 2 X 0 or
there exists some g0 such that fa0; g0g % fag. In the second case, the existence of some f 0
such that fa0; f 0g  fag follows from Richness. In the rst case, choose by Proposition 7
some bg 2 X 0 such that fbgg  fag and, by Certainty Equivalence, some eg 2 X 0 such that
fegg  fa; bgg. By Averaging and transitivity, one has fag  fegg  fa; bgg  feg; bgg 
fbgg. Hence one has feg; bgg  fag  fa0; egg so that, by Richness, there exists ea 2 X 0 such
that fea; egg  fag. Choosing then a0 = ea and f 0 = eg gives the result. If a 6= f , we can
do the previous reasoning for the certainty equivalent of fa; fg that exists by Certainty
Equivalence. If either a0 or f 0 2 fag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg, we can redo the
procedure while starting with another a0. Since the set fag[fbg[fcg[fdg[feg[ffg
is nite, we will redo the procedure at most a nite number of times. Hence we are
sure to nd a0 and f 0 2 X 0nfag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg such that fa0g  fag;
ffg  ff 0g and fa0; f 0g  fag[ffg and, by redoing the above procedure as many times
as required, we can choose as many distinct pairs of such a0 and f 0as we want. Choose
now some b0 such that fb0g [ ff 0g  fb; fg. This is possible because fb; f 0g  fb; fg
thanks to Restricted Independence. Moreover it is impossible that febg [ ff 0g  fb; fg
for all eb in X 0. Indeed, since fa0; f 0g  fag [ ffg, assuming febg [ ff 0g  fb; fg for
all eb would imply, by transitivity, that fag [ ffg  fb; fg. Yet using Averaging (if
a = f) or Restricted Independence (if a 6= f), this would imply in turn that fag  fbg,
contradicting our assumption that fag  fbg. Hence, there are consequences eb such that
fb; fg % feb; f 0g so that, by Richness, one can nd b0 such that fb0; f 0g  fb; fg. Given
our exibility for choosing a0 and f 0 it is clear that b0 can be chosen so that it does not
belong to fag[fa0g[fbg[fcg[fdg[feg[ffg[ff 0g. Thanks to case (ii), we know that
we can obtain fa0; dg  fb0; eg if we replace a by a0, f by f 0and b by b0 in the antecedent
clause of the lemma. Since fa0g  fag, we know that fa0; dg  fag[fdg by Restricted
Independence (if a 6= d) or by Averaging (if a = d). Hence, it follows from transitivity
that fb0; eg  fa0; dg  fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg. Combine now as before the axioms of
Averaging and Richness to nd b00 such that fag[fdg  fb00g[feg  fbg[feg. Using
Richness, one can also nd some f 00 such that fag[fdg  fb00g[ff 00g and some a00 such
that fa00g[ff 00g  ffg[feg. As before, we have the exibility to nd these b00; f 00 or a00
in such a way that they not belong to fag[fbg[fcg[fdg[feg[ffg. Thanks to case (ii)
again, we can obtain the conclusion that fa00; dg  fb00; eg. Since fa00g  fag, we have
fa00g[fdg  fag[fdg by Restricted Independence (if a 6= d) or by Averaging (if a = d).
We then obtain from transitivity that fag [ fdg  fb00; eg  fa00; dg  fag [ fdg, a
contradiction.
(iv) Suppose c 6= f and e 6= b 6= f . The di¤erence with case (iii) is that we relax
the constraint e 6= c 6= d. Hence, as before, this case is more general than case (iii).
Suppose by contradiction that the lemma is false and that fag [ fdg 6 fbg [ feg. As
before, the completeness of % implies either fag [ fdg  fbg [ feg or fag [ fdg 
fbg [ feg. Since these two cases are symmetric, we only provide the argument for
the rst one. Using arguments analogous to those in Case (iii), one can nd c0 and
d0 2 X 0nfag [ fbg [ fcg [ fdg [ feg [ ffg such that fd0g  fdg, fcg  fc0g
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and fc0; d0g  fcg [ fdg. As in case (iii) also, one can nd some e0 2 X 0nfag [
fbg [ fc; c0g [ fd; d0g [ feg [ ffg such that fc0; e0g  fcg [ feg. Thanks to case
(iii), we know that we can obtain fag [ fd0g  fbg [ fe0g out of the assumption that
fag [ ffg  fc0g [ fe0g and fc0g [ fd0g  fbg [ ffg. Since fd0g  fdg, we have
fa; d0g  fag [ fdg by Restricted Independence (if a 6= d) or Averaging (if a = d).
Hence by transitivity we have: fbg[fe0g  fag[fd0g  fag[fdg  fbg[feg. Using
analogous argument as for the consequences a00, b00 and f 00 of case (iii), nd now c00, d00
and e00 2 X 0nfag[fbg[fc; c0g[fd; d0g[fe; e0g[ffg such that 1) fag[fdg  fb; e00g 
fbg[feg, 2) fc00; e00g  fag[ffg and 3) fc00; d00g  fbg[ffg. We know from (iii) that
fag [ ffg  fc; e00g and fc; d00g  fbg [ ffg implies fag [ fd00g  fbg [ fe00g. Since
fd00g  fdg, we have fag[fd00g  fag[fdg by Restricted Independence (if a 6= d) or by
Averaging (if a = d). Transitivity then yields fag[fdg  fb; e00g  fa; d00g  fag[fdg,
a contradiction.
(v) Suppose c 6= f . The di¤erence with case (iv) is that we relax the constraint e 6=
b 6= f . Hence this case is more general than case (iv) and we handle it in an analogous
fashion (conditional on (iv)) to what was done for case (iv) conditional to case (iii).
We notice that subcases (i) and (v) are exhaustive, conditional on Case 4.
5. fag  fbg and fdg - feg. This case is handled in the same way as Case 4.
Another result used in the proof of Theorem 2 is the following.
Lemma 3 Let % be an ordering on P (X 0) satisfying Averaging and Restricted Independence.
Then for every (not necessarily distinct) consequences a, b, c, and d 2 X 0, fag [ fbg %
fcg [ fbg , fag [ fdg % fcg [ fdg.
Proof. We consider several cases.
1) a 6= b, c 6= b, a 6= d and c 6= d. The result then follows immediately from Restricted In-
dependence.
2) a = b, c 6= b, a 6= d and c 6= d. Assume fag[fbg % fcg[fbg or, equivalently under our
assumption, that fag % fa; cg. By Averaging this statement is equivalent to fag % fcg
which is itself equivalent, using Restricted Independence, to fa; dg = fag [ fdg %
fc; dg = fcg [ fdg.
3) a 6= b, c = b, a 6= d and c 6= d. Assume fag[fbg % fcg[fbg or, equivalently under our
assumption, that fa; bg % fbg. By Averaging, this statement is equivalent to fag % fbg
and, by Restricted Independence, to fa; dg = fag [ fdg % fb; dg = fcg [ fdg.
4) a 6= b, c 6= b, a = d and c 6= d. Assume fag [ fbg % fcg [ fbg or, equivalently under
our assumption, that fa; bg % fc; bg. Using Restricted Independence, this is equivalent
to fag = fdg % fcg which, by Averaging, is equivalent to fdg = fag [ fdg % fd; cg =
fcg [ fdg.
5) a 6= b, c 6= b, a 6= d and c = d. Assume fag [ fbg % fcg [ fbg or, equivalently under
our assumption, that fa; bg % fc; bg = fd; bg. Using Restricted Independence, this is
equivalent to fag % fdg which, by Averaging, is equivalent to fa; dg = fag [ fdg %
fdg = fcg [ fdg.
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6) a = b = c 6= d. In that case reexivity ensures that fag [ fbg % fcg [ fbg , fag %
fag , fag [ fdg = fa; dg % fa; dg = fc; dg = fcg [ fdg.
All other cases are handled trivially using reexivity.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Proposition 1 establishes that any UEU criterion satises Averaging and Restricted
Independence. To prove the converse implication, consider the restriction of the ordering % to
the set of all subsets of X 0 containing at most two consequences. Dene the binary relationb% on X 0  X 0 by (a; b) b% (c; d) , fag [ fbg % fcg [ fdg. The binary relation b% is well-
dened and is clearly an ordering of X 0  X 0 if % is an ordering of P (X 0). We also notice
that, thanks to Lemma 3, the binary relation b% satises the property that if (a; b) b% (c; b)
holds for some a; b and c, then (a; d) b% (c; d) holds for all d 2 X 0. This property is called
"independence" by KLST [12] (p. 249, Denition 1). We similarly obtain that b% satises both
Thomsens condition (see KLST, p. 250, Denition 3) and the "restricted solvability" condition
(KLST, p. 250, Denition 5) using respectively Lemma 2 and the Richness axiom respectively.
Finally, we note that our Archimedean axiom implies the property of the same name of KLST
(p. 253, Denition 4) while our assumption that % is non trivial implies, thanks to Averaging
(and specically the Gardenförs condition), that each component of X 0X 0 is essential as per
KLST Denition 6 (p. 256). Hence the triple (X 0; X 0; b%) is an additive conjoint structure in
the sense of KLST (Denition 7, p. 256). By virtue of Theorem 2 of KLST (p. 257), there are
real-valued functions i (for i = 1; 2) both having X 0 as domain such that:
(a; b) b% (c; d), 1(a) + 2(b)  1(c) + 2(d)
for all consequences a, b, c and d 2 X 0. Since (a; b) b% (c; d) , fag [ fbg % fcg [ fdg ,
fbg [ fag % fdg [ fcg , (b; a) b% (d; c), the ordering b% is symmetric so that 1(x) =
2(x) = u(x) must hold for every x 2 X 0 for some function u : X 0 ! R. By virtue of the
second part of Theorem 2 in KLST, the function u is unique up to an a¢ ne transform. Let us
now show that, for all subsets A and B of X 0 containing at most two consequences, one has
A % B ,Pa2A u(a)#A Pa2A u(a)#A so that % can be represented as per (1). If#A = #B = 1,
then one has, for all x and y 2 X 0, fxg % fyg , fxg[fxg % fyg[fyg , 2u(x)  2u(y),
u(x)  u(y) so that the numerical representation holds for that case. The argument clearly
works just as well if #A = #B = 2. Suppose now that #A = 1 and #B = 2. Then, for all x,
y and z 2 X 0 such that y 6= z, one has:
fxg % fy; zg () fxg [ fxg % fyg [ fzg
() (x; x) b% (y; z)
() u(x) + u(x)  u(y) + u(z)() u(x)  u(y) + u(z)
2
so that the numerical representation holds for that case also.
8.2 Extending Theorem 2 to all nite subsets of P(X 0).
We now prove the following theorem (that restricts Theorem 1 to the set P(X 0)).
Theorem 4 Let % be a non-trivial ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Richness. Then % satises
Averaging, Restricted Independence and the Archimedean axiom if and only if it is a UEU
criterion. Furthermore, the u function in the denition of a UEU criterion is unique up to a
positive a¢ ne transformation.
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The rst step in proving this theorem consists in proving the following lemma 4 mentioned
in section 3.
Lemma 4 Let U = fu1; :::; ung be a set of n numbers with arithmetic mean u such that
u1  u2  :::  un . Dene the n  1 sequences fbihg, i = 1; 2; :::: and h = 1; :::; n  1 by:
b0n 1 = (un + un 1)=2,
b0h = (uh + b
0
h+1)=2






















bih = u for all h = 1; :::; n  1
Proof.
We nd useful to represent the sequence dened in this lemma in the following array, with
n  1 columns and an innite number of rows:
1 2 ... n  2 n  1
b0 (u1 + b
0
2)=2 (u2 + b
0
3)=2 ... (un 2 + b0n 1)=2 (un 1 + un)=2






2)=2 !... (b1n 3 + b0n 2)=2 (b1n 2 + b0n 1)=2






2)=2 ... (b2n 1 + b1n 2)=2 (b1n 2 + b0n 1)=2






2)=2 !... (b3n 3 + b2n 2)=2 (b3n 2 + b2n 1)=2
... ... ... ... ... ...
We are going to show that the grand sequence that starts from the north-east of the
array and follows the arrows up to innity, converges to u. Since the sequence fbihg is the
hth column of this array and, therefore, a subsequence of the grand sequence, the conclusion
of the lemma would follow immediately. Dene accordingly the grand sequence fbbtg, for
t = i(n  1) + 1; :::; (i+ 1)(n  1), and i = 0; 1; 2; :::by:
bbt = bin (t+1 (i(n 1)+1)) if i is even andbbt = bit+1 (i(n 1)+1) if i is odd
Any element of the grand sequence can be written as a weighted average of fu1; :::; ung. In
particular, for all t = 1; :::, there exists n  1 real numbers t1; :::; tn 1 such that:
bbt = t1u1 + t2u2 + ::::+ tn 1un 1 + tn 1un
Moreover inspection reveals that th is dened by the following recursive formula:
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h ) if t  n  h+ 1
where m(t) is dened as the largest integer strictly smaller than t that is divisible by n   1.





n for all h. In what follows
we will x h 2 f1; ::; n   1g and drop the subscript h from the sequence fthg for notational
convenience.
Once again, it is convenient to refer to the aforementioned representation of the sequence
ftg, t = 1; ::as an array with n  1 columns and an innite number of rows. We start from the
rst row with 1 and move left until we reach n 1. We then move down to the second row
where the rst element from the left is n. Let t be an arbitrary integer. If we write t = m(t)+s,
it follows that t lies in the (m(t)+1)th row of this array. If m(t) is even the (m(t)n 1 +1)
th row is
increasing from right to left so that t is the sth element from the right in this row. If m(t) is
odd, then t is the sth element from the left in the (m(t)n 1 +1)
th row which increases from left to
right. It follows that in this array, t for t > n  1 is the arithmetic mean of the element which
immediately precedes it in the row and the element of the same column in the row above.
The proof proceeds in two steps. The rst is to show that the sequence ftg, t = 1; :::is
convergent and the second is to show that the limit of the sequence is, in fact 1n . In order to
establish the rst step, we rst record the two following properties P1 and P2 of the sequence
which can be easily veried.
P1. Let r > 1 be an odd integer. The sequence strictly increases from (r 1)(n 1)+1 to
(r 1)(n 1)+h and then strictly decreases from (r 1)(n 1)+h to r(n 1). If r is an even in-
teger, then the sequence strictly increases from (r 1)(n 1)+1 to (r 1)(n 1)+n h and strictly
decreases from (r 1)(n 1)+n h to r(n 1). Thus for every row r in the array, the sequence in-
creases from the right as we move left for h terms and then decreases for the remaining n h 1
terms. Clearly (r 1)(n 1)+h is the largest element of the rth row if r is odd and (r 1)(n 1)+n h
if r is even. Note that the maximal element of any row is in the hthcolumn from the right.










Thus each term of the sequence can be expressed as the weighted sum of the terms of the
sequence in the row above.
CLAIM: Let r > 1 be an integer. If r is odd, then :
(i) (r 1)(n 1)+h   r(n 1) < 1[(r 1)(n 1)+n h   (r 1)(n 1)+1] and
(ii) (r 1)(n 1)+h   (r 1)(n 1)+1 < 2[(r 1)(n 1)+n h   (r 1)(n 1)]
and if r is even, then:
(iii) (r 1)(n 1)+n h   (r 1)(n 1)+1 < 1[(r 2)(n 1)+n h   (r 1)(n 1)] and,






















Since (r 1)(n 1)+1 = (r 1)(n 1) and (r 2)(n 1)+n h is the largest term in the (r   1)th row
according to P1, we conclude that :












Since 2 = (1  12h 1 ), this establishes (ii).








Since (r 1)(n 1)+1 = (r 1)(n 1) and since, from P1, we know that (r 1)(n 1)+h is the largest
term in the (r   1)th row, we obtain:












Since 1 = (1  12n h 1 ), this establishes (iii).




















































Note that, according to P1, (r 1)(n 1)+n h is the largest element in its row. This, combined
with the fact that:
































































The proof of (iv) is symmetric to that of (i) and we omit the details.
We will use the inequalities in the claim to put an upper bound on the distance between
terms in the same row of the array. Let r > 1 be an odd integer. Applying (i) in the claim, we
have:
(r 1)(n 1)+h   r(n 1) < 1((r 1)(n 1)+n h   (r 2)(n 1)+1)
Observe that (r 2)(n 1)+n h   (r 2)(n 1)+1 can be written as
(r
0 1)(n 1)+n h   (r0 1)(n 1)+1 where r0 = r   1. Since r0 is an even integer, we can apply
(iii) to obtain:
(r 1)(n 1)+h   r(n 1) < 21[(r 3)(n 1)+n h   (r 2)(n 1)+1]:
Hence applying (i) and (iii) repeatedly, we conclude that:











By the same argument (r 1)(n 1)+n h   (r 1)(n 1)+1 < 
r 1
1
2 when r is even. Moreover, from
analogous arguments, we obtain that:




when r is odd and:




when r is even.
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Let r be an odd integer. The left-most and right-most terms in row r are (r(n 1)and
(r 1)(n 1)+1 respectively. Using the triangle inequality and the bounds derived in the previous
paragraph, it follows that:







If r is an even integer, and the left-most and right-most terms in row r are (r 1)(n 1)+1 and
(r(n 1) respectively, one has:
jjr(n 1)   (r 1)(n 1)+1jj  jjr(n 1)   r(n 1)+n hjj







Note that the maximal di¤erence of terms in row r is strictly less than 12 max[1; 2]
r 1.
Pick an integer t such that t = r(n 1) where r is an odd integer i.e. t is the left-most term
in row r and m(t) = r. Let q = r0(n   1) where r0 > r. Note that, by repeated application of
the triangle inequality, it follows that jjt   qjj is less than the sum of the di¤erences between
the left-most and right-most terms of all rows starting from r + 1. Hence:
























(note that we critically use the fact that 1 and 2 are strictly less than 1). Now let 
q be a
term in row r0 where r0 > r. Applying the triangle inequality again, we have:










Observe that ^(t)! 0 as t!1. Pick " > 0 and let T be such that ^(t) < " for all t > T . We
have shown that jjT   qjj < " for all q > T . Hence the sequence t is a Cauchy sequence and
is convergent.
We now show that the sequence converges to 1n . Suppose it converges to . Let t and k be
positive integers such that t+ 1 = k(n  1) and consider the following sequence of di¤erences.
t+1   t = 1
2
((k 2)(n 1)+1   t) (5)
t   t 1 = 1
2
((k 2)(n 1)+2   t 1) (6)
::: = :::
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t (n 3)   t (n 2) = 1
2
((k 1)(n 1)   (k 1)(n 1)) (7)
t (n 2)   t (n 1) = 1
2
((k 2)(n 1)+1   (k 1)(n 1) 1) (8)
::: = :::
n h+1   n h = 1
2
(0   n h) (9)
It is clear from these t   n + h equalities that, except for the rst n   2 negative terms of the
right hand sides, every positive term of the rst n   1 lines has an identical negative term in
one of the lines n+ 1,...,2n. Hence, if we sum the equalities (5)-(9), we get:






Observe that n h = 1=2. Also, fk(n 1) ig, for k = 1; :::, is a subsequence of the original
sequence for all i = 1; :::; n  2. Since the original sequence converges to , these subsequences
must also converge to . Therefore by taking limits on both sides of the equation above, we
obtain   1=2 =  1=2(n  2), so that  = 1n , as required.
An important preliminary step in the proof of Theorem 4 is the proof that if the ordering
% of P (X 0) satises Restricted Independence and Averaging, then it satises, given Richness,
the following property of Attenuation.
Denition 2 The ordering % of P(X 0) satises Attenuation if for all sets A, B and C 2 P(X)
satisfying A  B, A \ C = B \ C = ; and #A > #B, C  A implies A [ C  B [ C and
A  C implies A [ C  B [ C.
The next two lemmas establish that any ordering % of P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Re-
stricted Independence and Richness satises Attenuation.
Lemma 5 Let % be an ordering of P(X) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence and
Richness. Then, for all A, B 2 P(X 0), such that #A  #B  2, and for all sets C 2 P(X 0)
such that C \ (A [ B) = ?, there are consequences x1; : : : ; xn 2 X 0n(A [ B [ C) such that
B  B [ fx1; : : : ; xng.
Proof. Dene n = #A #B. We distinguish three cases.
n = 2. Using Proposition 7 and Certainty Equivalence, choose a consequence a such that B 
fag. By Averaging, B  B [ fag. Using again Proposition 7 and Certainty Equivalence,
nd a consequence e 2 X 0 such that feg  B [ fag. By Averaging and transitivity, we
have B  B [ fag  B [ fa; eg.
 If there is b 2 X 0such that B [ fa; bg - B, then, by Richness, there is a c 2 X 0
such that fa; cg [B  B. If a or c belongs to A [B [ C, we then repeat the same
procedure starting with another a. Since A[B[C is nite, we can do this repetition
at most a nite number of times so that, at the end, we can nd a and c 2 X 0such
that fa; cg [B  B and fa; cg \ (A [B [ C) = ;.
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 If B [ fa; bg  B for allb 2 X 0, choose (thanks to Proposition 7 and Certainty
Equivalence) b and e 2 X 0 such that feg  fbg  B. By Averaging, one has
B [ fb; eg  B [ fbg  B and, by assumption, B [ fa; bg  B. Hence, by Richness,
there is a c 2 X 0 such that B [ fb; cg  B. If b or c belongs to A [ B [ C, we
can repeat the same reasoning starting with another b. Again, the niteness of
A [ B [ C guarantees that the repetition of the procedure will be nite and will
lead, eventually, to b and c such that fb; cg [B  B and fb; cg \ (A [B [ C) = ;.
n = 3. We have just proved that we can nd a and c 2 X 0 such that B [ fa; cg  B and
fa; cg \ (A [ B) = ;. It can be noticed that fag 6 fcg. Choose now (thanks again
to Proposition 7 and Certainty Equivalence) some d 2 X 0 such that fdg  B [ fa; cg.
By Averaging and transitivity, one has B [ fa; c; dg  B [ fa; cg  B. Choose also
(Proposition 7 and Certainty Equivalence) some e 2 X 0 such that feg  B [ fa; cg. By
Averaging and transitivity, B [fa; c; eg  B [fa; cg  B. By Richness, there is a f 2 X 0
such that B [ fa; c; fg  B [ fa; cg  B. By Restricted Independence and transitivity,
we must have either fag  ffg  fcg or fag  ffg  fcg. If f 2 A[B [C, then we can
redo the procedure as many times as required starting with another a or c.
n > 3. If n = 2m for some integer m > 1, then we apply m times the reasoning of the case
n = 2. If n = 2m+ 1 for some integer m > 1, then we apply (m  1) times the reasoning
of the case n = 2 and once the reasoning of case n = 3.
Lemma 6 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence and
Richness. Then % satises the property of Attenuation.
Proof. Let A and B be sets in P(X) such that A  B and #A > #B and let n = #A #B
and let C be a set in P(X) such that A  C. Since the argument works symmetrically for A  C
or A  C, we only provide it for the later case. The argument requires that we distinguish 3
cases.
n  2. By Lemma 5, there are x1; : : : ; xn such that B [ fx1; : : : ; xng  B and fx1; : : : ; xng \
(B [C) = ;. By Restricted Independence, A[C  B [ fx1; : : : ; xng [C. By Averaging,
fx1; : : : ; xng  B  A. Suppose A  C. By Averaging, B  B[C. Hence fx1; : : : ; xng 
B[C. By Averaging again, B[fx1; : : : ; xng[C  B[C. By transitivity, A[C  B[C.
n = 1; #B  2. We rst show that there exists some x 2 X 0 and some set B0 2 P(X 0) such
that x =2 B0; fxg  B0  B;#B0 = #B and B0\C = ;. Indeed, use Certainty Equivalence
to dene x by fxg  B. If x =2 B, then dene B0 = B and the proof is done. If x 2 B,
choose a c 2 X 0 such that fcg  fxg and fcg % fyg for all y 2 B [ C (if any) such that
fyg  fxg. The niteness of B[C as well as Proposition 7 guarantees the existence of such
a c. Using similar arguments, one can also nd a consequence d 2 X 0 such that fxg  fdg
and fdg - fzg for all z 2 B [ C (if any) such that fxg  fzg. Moreover, c and d can be
chosen in such a way that fxg - fc; dg. Indeed, if fxg  fc; dg for some initial choice of
c and d, then, we know from Averaging that fx; dg  fxg  fc; dg. Hence by Richness,
there exists a c0 such that fc0; dg  fxg. Since fc0; dg  fxg  fc; dg, we must have from
Restricted Independence that fc0g  fcg and, since fdg  fxg and fc0; dg  fxg, it follows
from Averaging and transitivity that fxg  fc0g. We then have fxg  fc0g  fcg % fyg
for all y 2 B [C (if any) such that fyg  fxg. Hence replacing c by c0 leads immediately
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to the statement that fxg - fc0; dg. Assuming therefore fxg - fc; dg, we consider two
cases.
1: #B = 2m, for some strictly positive integer m. Choose m di¤erent consequences
z1; : : : ; zm 2 X 0 such thatfcg  fz1g  : : :  fzmg  fxg. This is clearly possible thanks
to Certainty Equivalence. By assumption, zi =2 B [ C. For i = 1 : : :m, dene z0i by
fxg  fzi; z0ig. This is possible thanks to Richness and the fact that fxg - fc; dg -
fzi; dg (by Restricted Independence and transitivity) and that fxg  fzig  fzi; cg 
fcg (by Averaging and transitivity). Using again Averaging and transitivity, one obtains
that fzi; z0ig  fxg  fzi; xg. It then follows from Restricted Independence that fz0ig 
fxg. We now prove that fz0ig  fdg, for i = 1 : : :m. Suppose by contradiction, using
the completeness of %, that fdg - fz0ig for some i. By Restricted Independence and
transitivity, we would then have fzi; dg - fzi; z0ig  fxg. Yet, since fcg  fzig, we
have by Restricted Independence and transitivity that fc; dg  fzi; dg - fzi; z0ig  fxg,
in violation of fxg - fc; dg. Hence, since fxg  fz0ig  fdg, we know that z0i =2 B [ C.
Dene then B0 = fz1; : : : ; zm; z01; : : : ; z0mg. By repeated application of Averaging and
transitivity, one obtains that B0  fxg  B and, by construction, that B0 \ C = ; and
x =2 B0.
2: #B = 2m+1, for some strictly positive integerm. Using Certainty Equivalence, dene
c0 and c00 by fc0g  fc; xg and fc00g  fc0; cg. We know that fxg - fc; dg and, by Restricted
Independence and transitivity, fxg - fc; dg  fc00; dg  fc0; dg. Moreover, by Averaging
and transitivity, we have that fxg  fc; xg  fc0g  fc0; cg  fc00g  fcg. Hence, using
Richness, one can dene d0 and d00 by fc0; d0g  fxg and fc00; d00g  fxg. As in the case
#B = 2m, we can show that fdg  fd00g  fd0g  fxg. Hence, fc00; c0; d0; d00g\(B[C) =
;. Since fd0g  fd00g, we have fxg  fc0; d0g  fc0; d00g (by Restricted Independence and
transitivity) and, by Averaging and transitivity, that fxg  fc0; d00; dg. Now, by Averaging
again, fc00; c0; d0; d00g  fxg. Hence, since fcg  fc00g, we have fc; c0; d0; d00g  fxg (by
Restricted Independence and transitivity). Moreover, since fxg  fd0g, Averaging implies
fc0; c; d00g  fxg. Hence, fc0; c; d00g  fxg  fc0; d00; dg. By Richness, there is a e such that
fxg  fc0; d00; eg. One can not have fcg % feg because this would imply, using Restricted
Independence and transitivity, that fxg  fc0; d00; eg - fc0; d00; cg, in contradiction of
fxg  fc0; d00; cg. Analogously feg % fxg can not hold because, if it did, one would
have, using Restricted Independence and transitivity, that fxg  fc0; d00; eg % fc0; d00; xg
and, using Averaging, that fxg % fc0; d00g, a contradiction. Hence, since % is complete,
fcg  feg  fxg. We therefore conclude that fc0; d00; eg \ B [ C = ;. Choose now
(m  1) di¤erent consequences z1; : : : ; zm 1 2 X 0 in such a way that fc0g  fz1g  : : : 
fzm 1g  fxg. It is always possible to choose them di¤erent from c0; d00 and e. For
i = 1 : : :m   1, dene as in the previous case z0i by fxg  fzi; z0ig. As in the previous
case also, we can show that z0i is such that fxg  fz0i} fdg for i = 1 : : :m   1. Dene
therefore B0 by B0 = fc0; d00; e; z1; : : : ; zm 1; z01; : : : ; z0m 1g. By Averaging, B0  fxg  B
and, by construction, B0 \B [ C = ; and x =2 B0.
Given the existence of the set B0 and the consequence x with the required property, we
consider two cases.
x =2 C. By Averaging, B0 [ fxg  A. By Restricted Independence, B [ C  B0 [ C
and B0 [ fxg [ C  A [ C. Suppose A  C. Hence, B0  C and, by Averaging,
B0  B0[C  C. We also have fxg  B0[Cand, by Averaging, fxg  B0[fxg[C 
B0 [ C. By transitivity, A [ C  B [ C.
x 2 C. We must then have that #C > 1, as assuming otherwise would imply that
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C = fxg  B  A. Using the same argument as above, there is a set C 0 2 P(X)
satisfying C 0  C, #C 0 = #C; x =2 C 0; B \ C 0 = ;; B0 \ C 0 = ;; A \ C 0 = ;. By
Restricted Independence, B [ C  B0 [ C, B0 [ C  B0 [ C 0;A [ C  A [ C 0,
and B0 [ fxg [ C 0  A [ C 0. Suppose A  C. Hence, B0  C 0and, by Averaging,
B0  B0 [ C 0  C 0. We also have fxg  B0 [ fxg [ C 0  B0 [ C 0. By transitivity,
A [ C  B [ C.
n = 1; #B = 1. Suppose rst that #C = 1. Write A, B and C as: A = fa; bg, B = fxg
and C = fcg and assume that fxg  fa; bg  fcg. Assume, contrary to what is required
by Attenuation, that fa; b; cg % fx; cg. By Certainty Equivalence, there exists a z 2 X 0
such that fzg  fx; cg. Since fxg  fcg, fxg  fzg  fcg by Averaging so that
z is distinct from either x or c. We therefore have (using Averaging and transitivity)
fa; b; cg % fx; cg  fzg  fx; c; zg. It then follows from Restricted Independence and
transitivity that fa; bg % fx; zg  fxg, contradicting fxg  fa; bg. Suppose now that
#C > 1. Suppose fxg fa; bg  C but, contrary to what is required by Attenuation,
fa; bg [ C % fxg [ C. By Certainty Equivalence, there is a consequence z 2 X 0such
fzg  fxg [ C. By Averaging (since x =2 C), one has fxg  fzg  C. One has therefore
fa; bg [ C % fxg [ C  fzg. If z =2 C, then Averaging and transitivity entails that
fzg  fx; zg [ C. Using then Restricted Independence and transitivity, one obtains that
fa; bg % fx; zg  fxg, a contradiction. If z 2 C, then apply Certainty Equivalence
recursively to nd a sequence of zt such that fztg  fzt 1; xg for t = 1; :::starting with
z0 = z. Since there are only nitely many elements in C, one will eventually nd some t for
which zt =2 Cand fxg  fztg  :::  fzg  C. By Averaging fxg[C  fxg[Cnfzg  fzg.
Since fzg  fztg, we have, by transitivity and Averaging, that fzg  fxg [ Cnfzg 
fx; ztg[C  fztg. We therefore have fa; bg[C % fxg[C  fzg  fxg[C  fx; ztg[C
which implies, thanks to Restricted Independence and transitivity, that fa; bg  fzt; xg
and, by Averaging and transitivity, that fa; bg  fxg, again a contradiction.
We next establish some further auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 7 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence, and
Richness. Then, if A;B 2 P(X 0) and c is a consequence in X 0 such that A  B[fcg,then there
exists some e 2 X 0 such that feg  fcg and A  B [ feg. Dually, if A;B 2 P(X 0) and c is
a consequence in X 0 such that A  B [ fcg, then there exists e 2 X 0such that feg  fcg and
A  B [ feg.
Proof. We only prove the rst statement and distinguish three cases.
(a) A  B [ fdg, in which case the proof is done.
(b) A  B [ fdg. Then, by Certainty Equivalence, there exists e such that feg  fd; cg.
By Averaging, fdg  feg  fcg. By Restricted Independence, B [ fdg  B [ feg so that the
statement A  B [ feg follows.
(c) A  B [ fdg. In that case the Richness axiom applies and there is a consequence f such
that A  B [ ffg and we proceed as in case (b).
We next establish that if % is an ordering of P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Inde-
pendence, Richness and Attenuation (Lemma 6), then it satises the following condition.
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Condition 3 For all distinct consequences a, b, c and d 2 X and every set B 2 P(X) such
that fbg  fc; dg and B \ fb; c; dg = ;, we must have:
(i) fag % B [ fbg and fbg % fag with at least one strict ranking imply fa; bg  B [ fc; dg, and
(ii)fag - B [ fbg and fbg  fag with at least one strict ranking imply fa; bg  B [ fc; dg.
Three auxiliary lemmas are needed in order to establish this. The rst of them is the fol-
lowing.
Lemma 8 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence and
Richness. Let A and B be two nite subsets of X 0 and let a, b, c and d be consequences in X 0
satisfying A[fag  B [fbg, #A = #B, fbg  fc; dg, a 6= b, c 6= d, fa; bg\A = fc; dg\B = ;
and b =2 B. Then A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg.
Proof. Suppose rst fcg  fdg. By Averaging, fbg  fcg  fdg. Since c 6= d, we have
c 6= b or d 6= b. Assume without loss of generality that c 6= b. By Restricted Independence,
B [ fbg  B [ fcg. Therefore A [ fag  B [ fbg  B [ fcg and, by Restricted Independence,
A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; bg. By Restricted Independence again, B [ fc; bg  B [ fc; dg. Finally, by
transitivity, A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg.
Suppose now fcg 6 fdg and assume, without loss of generality, that fcg  fdg. Two cases
need to be considered.
1. Assume by contradiction that A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg. Let us show that there is a d
such that A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg  B [ fc; dg. Choose some u distinct from c such that
fug  fdg. The existence of such a u is guaranteed by the fact that fcg  fdg and, using
Certainty Equivalence, that one can always dene u by fug  fc; dg. By Averaging, one
must have fcg  fug  fdg which, given the reexivity of %, implies that u is distinct
from both c and d. By Restricted Independence, one has B [ fc; ug  B [ fc; dg. Two
mutually exclusive cases can occur.
 B [ fc; ug - A [ fa; bg. By Averaging and Certainty Equivalence, one can nd
some e such that A [ fa; bg  e  B [ fc; dg. By Richness, there is d such that
B [ fc; dg  feg. Hence A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg  B [ fc; dg
 A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; ug. In this case, let d = u.
By Certainty Equivalence, there is a b such that fbg  fc; dg. Notice that we can
always choose d so that d and b do not belong to B [ fcg [ A [ fag. By Restricted
Independence, fbg  fbg. By Averaging, fbg  fc; dg  fb; bg  fbg. By Restricted
Independence, B[fc; dg  B[fb; bg. By Restricted Independence, A[fa; bg  A[fa; bg
and A[fa; bg  B[fb; bg. By transitivity, B[fc; dg  A[fa; bg. But we have previously
shown that A [ fa; bg  B [ fc; dg. A contradiction.
2. Assume by contradiction that A[fa; bg  B[fc; dg. This case is treated like the previous
one.
The next Lemma provides the second step in the proof that Averaging, Restricted Indepen-
dence and Richness imply Condition 3.
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Lemma 9 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence and
Richness and let a, b, c and d be consequences in X 0and B be a nite subset of X 0 such that
fag % B [ fbg, fbg  fc; dg, fbg  fag, b =2 B and fc; dg \ B = ;. Then there exists a nite
subset A0 of X 0 and some consequence a0 2X 0 such that A0 [ fa0g  B [ fbg, a0 =2 A0 and
#A0 = #B.
Proof. Start with fbg  fag % B [ fbg. By Averaging, fbg  B. Write B as B =
fb1; : : : ; brg with fb1g - fb2g - : : : - fbrg. Let bj be such that fbjg  fbg and fbg - bi for
all i > j. The existence of such a bj is guaranteed by Averaging. By Certainty Equivalence,
one can nd some b0j in X
0 such that b0j  fb; bjg. By Averaging, bj  b0j  b. Dene A0
by A0 = B [ fb0jg n fbjg. By Averaging and transitivity, one has A0  B. By Restricted
Independence, A0 [ fbg  B [ fbg. By construction, A0 [ fbjg = B [ fb0jg. By Restricted
Independence, B [ fbg  B [ fb0jg. Hence A0 [ fbg  B [ fbg  B [ fb0jg = A0 [ fbjg. By
Richness, there exists some a0 such that A0 [ fa0g  B [ fbg. By Restricted Independence, one
has fbg  fa0g  fb0jg, which, given the denition of A0, establishes that a0 =2 A0.
Combining these two lemmas, we can establish the following.
Lemma 10 Let % be an ordering on P(X 0) satisfying Averaging, Restricted Independence and
Richness. Then % satises Condition 3.
Proof. We prove only part (i) of condition 3, the proof of the other part being similar.
Suppose that we have fag % B [ fbg, fbg  fc; dg, fbg  fag, b =2 B and fc; dg \ B = ; for
consequences a, b, c, d in X 0 and some nite subset B of X 0. By Lemma 9, there exists a nite
set A0 and a consequence a0 such that A0[fa0g  B[fbg, a0 =2 A0and #A0 = #B. By Lemma 8,
we must have A0[fa0; bg  B[fc; dg. By Certainty Equivalence, there exists some a00 such that
a00  A0 [fa0g. By transitivity, fbg  fag % A0 [fa0g  fa00g. Since, by Lemma 6, the ordering
% satises Attenuation, one has A0 [ fa0; bg  fa00; bg. By transitivity, fa00; bg  B [ fc; dg.
Restricted Independence and fag % fa00g imply fb; ag % fb; a00g. Transitivity nally yields
fa; bg  B [ fc; dg.
We are now equipped to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Using Theorem 2, we nd a function u that uniquely represents (up to an a¢ ne
transform) % as per (1) on the subset of P(X 0) containing sets of cardinality no greater than
2. We want to prove that the same function u can also be used to represent % on the whole set
P(X 0). We must prove specically that, for any A 2 P(X 0) and g 2 X 0,






where u is the (unique up to an a¢ ne transform) utility function identied in Theorem 2. Since
% is complete, it is su¢ cient to prove ). Suppose #A = m and write A = fa1; a2; : : : ; amg
with fa1g - : : : - famg. By Certainty Equivalence, there exists b0m 1 2 X 0 such that b0m 1 
fam 1; amg. Similarly, for i = m 2; : : : ; 1, we can nd, by Certainty Equivalence, a consequence
b0i such that b
0
i  fai; b0i+1g. Using Certainty Equivalence repeatedly, one can dene this way





b2j 1i  fb2j 1i 1 ; b2j 2i g





b2ji  fb2j 1i ; b2ji+1g
for i = m  2; : : : ; 1. We rst show that:
(i) fbj1g - fbj2g - : : : - fbjm 1g,
(ii) fa1g - fbi1g - fbi+11 g - fbi+1m 1g - fbim 1g - famg and
(iii) fbi1g - A - fbim 1g.
If fa1g  famg, then, by Averaging, fa1g  A, fbijg  fa1g  A for all i 2 N and j 2
f1; : : : ;m   1g and the implications (i)-(iii) are immediately established. If fa1g  famg, let
k be the largest integer such that fakg  fak+1g. We rst prove implications (i) and (ii).
By Averaging, fam 1g - fb0m 1g - famg. By transitivity, fam 2g - fb0m 1g. By Averaging
again, fam 2g - fb0m 2g - fb0m 1g. By repeated use of transitivity and Averaging, one is led
to the conclusion that fak+1g - fb0k+1g - fb0k+2g. Now, by transitivity fakg  fb0k+1g and,
by Averaging, fakg  fb0kg  fb0k+1g. Analogously, a repeated combination of Averaging and
transitivity leads to the conclusion that fa1g  fb01g  fb02g. Hence, we have established that
fa1g  fb01g  fb0k+1g - fb0k+2g - : : : - fb0m 1g - famg. Now, by Averaging, fb01g  fb12g 
fb02g and, by transitivity, fb12g  fb03g. Combining in this way Averaging and transitivity leads
us to fb1m 2g  fb1m 1g  fb0m 1g and, therefore, to fa1g  fb01g  fb11g  fb12g  : : : 
fb1m 1g  fb0m 1g - famg. Repeatedly using the same reasoning, we nd that, for all i,
fbi1g  fbi2g  : : :  fbim 1g and fa1g - fbi1g - fbi+11 g - fbi+1m 1g - fbim 1g - famg. We now
turn to implication (iii) that we prove in the following steps.
Step 1. We notice that by virtue of the Gärdenfors principle, fb0m 1g  A.
Step 2. We prove that fb01g  A. Since by assumption al = al+1for all l = k+1; :::;m  1, we
have by Averaging that fb0m 1g  famg  fam 1; amg  fam 2g fam 2; am 1; amg 
:::  fak+1; : : : ; am 1; amg. We therefore have fb0k+1g  fak+1; : : : ; am 1; amg  fak+1g.
Now, since fakg  fb0k+1g  fak+1; : : : ; am 1; amg, it follows from Attenuation (satis-
ed thanks to Lemma 6) that fak; b0k+1g  fak; ak+1; : : : ; am 1; amg and, since fb0kg 
fak; b0k+1g and % is transitive, that fb0kg  fak; : : : ; am 1; amg. Applying the same rea-
soning below k enables us to reach the conclusion that fb01g  fa1; : : : ; a2; amg = A.
Step 3. Since b11 = b
0
1, we trivially have that fb11g  A.
Step 4. We prove that fb1m 1g  A. Notice that fb11g  fa1; b02g, fb12g  fb11; b02g, fb02g 
fa2; b03g, fb11g  fb02g and clause (i) of Condition 3 (satised thanks to Lemma 10) imply
that fb12g  fa1; a2; b03g. Similarly, fb12g  fb11; b02g, fb13g  fb12; b03g and clause (i) of the
condition 3 imply that fb13g  fa1; a2; a3; b04g. Repeating this reasoning, we obtain fb1m 2g 
fa1; : : : ; am 2; b0m 1g and, nally, fb1m 1g  fa1; : : : ; amg = A.
Step 5. Trivially, fb2m 1g = fb1m 1g  A.
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Step 6. We prove that fb21g  A. We have fb2m 1g  fb0m 1; b0m 2g, fb2m 2g  fb2m 1; b1m 2g,
fb1m 2g  fb1m 3; b0m 2g and fb1m 2g  fb2m 1g. Hence, by clause (ii) of condition 3, fb2m 2g 
fb1m 3; b0m 2; b0m 1g. We also have fb2m 2g  fb1m 3; b0m 2; b0m 1g, fb2m 3g  fb2m 2; b1m 3g,
fb1m 3g  fb1m 4; b0m 3g and fb1m 3g  fb2m 2g. Hence, by clause (ii) of Condition 3:
fb2m 3g  fb1m 4; b0m 3; b0m 2; b0m 1g. This process can be repeated until we obtain:
fb22g  fb11; b02; b03; : : : ; b0m 1g = fb01; b02; b03; : : : ; b0m 1g:
By Lemma 7, there exists fc02g  fb02g such that fb22g  fb01; c02; b03; : : : ; b0m 1g. Repeatedly
applying Lemma 7, we nd fc0i g  fb0i g, for i = 3 : : :m 1 such that fb22g  fb01; c02; c03; : : : ; c0m 1g.
This, combined with fb21g  fb22; b11g, fb11g  fa1; b02g, fb11g  fb22g and clause (ii) of Condition
3, implies:
fb21g  fa1; c02; b02; c03; : : : ; c0m 1g. By Averaging, it follows that fc02; b02g  fb02g  fa2; b03g. By
Restricted Independence, one has fb21g  fa1; a2; c03; b03; : : : ; c0m 1g. By Averaging, fc03; b03g 
fb03g  fa3; b04g. By Restricted Independence:
fb21g  fa1; a2; a3; c04; b04; : : : ; c0m 1g.
Repeating this process leads us to the conclusion that:
fb21g  fa1; a2; : : : ; am 2; c0m 1; b0m 1g.
By Averaging, fc0m 1; b0m 1g  fb0m 1g  fam 1; amg. By Restricted Independence:
fb21g  fa1; a2; : : : ; am 2; am 1; amg = A.
Step 7. Trivially, fb31g = fb21g  A.
Step 8. We prove that fb3m 1g  A. We have fb31g  fb11; b22g, fb32g  fb31; b22g, fb22g 
fb12; b23g and fb22g  fb31g. Hence, by clause (i) of Condition 3, fb32g  fb11; b12; b23g. We also
have fb33g  fb32; b23g, fb23g  fb13; b24g and fb23g  fb32g. Hence, by clause (i) of Condition 3,
fb33g  fb11; b12; b13; b24g. Continuing this process, we obtain fb3m 2g  fb11; b12; : : : ; b1m 2; b2m 1g.
Repeatedly applying Lemma 7, we nd c1i such that fc1i g  fb1i g, for i = 1 : : :m   2 such that
fb3m 2g  fc11; c12; : : : ; c1m 2; b2m 1g. This, combined with fb3m 1g  fb2m 1; b3m 2g, fb2m 1g 
fb01; b1m 2g, fb2m 1g  fb3m 2g and clause (i) of Condition 3, implies that:
fb3m 1g  fc11; c12; : : : ; c1m 2; b1m 2; b0m 1g.
By Averaging and Restricted Independence:
fb3m 1g  fc11; : : : ; c1m 3; b1m 3; b0m 2; b0m 1g:
By repeatedly combining Averaging and Restricted Independence in this way, one is led to the
conclusion that:
fb3m 1g  fc11; b11; b02; b03; : : : ; b0m 1g:
Repeatedly applying Lemma 7, one nds d1i such that fd1i g  fb0i g, for i = 2 : : :m 1 for which:
fb3m 1g  fc11; b11; d02; d03; : : : ; d0m 1g:
Repeatedly applying Averaging and Restricted Independence, we obtain:
fb3m 1g  fa1; a2; : : : ; am 2; : : : ; am 1; amg = A:
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Step 9. Trivially, fb4m 1g = fb3m 1g  A.
Steps 6 to 9 can clearly be repeated innitely often using the same argument. This remark
completes the proof of (iii). Now, using Certainty Equivalence, let x be a consequence such
that A  fxg. Since the function u found in Theorem 2 represents % as per (1), one has
u(bi1)  u(x)  u(bim 1) for every i. Now it is easy to check that the sequences fu(bih)g for every






















8.3 Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. From Theorem 4, we know that if % is an ordering on P(X) satisfying Averaging,
Restricted Independence, Richness and the Archimedean axiom, then there exists a function
u : X 0 ! R such that, for all sets A and B 2 P(X 0), one has A % B ()Pa2A u(a)#A Pb2B u(b)#B .
If M(X) = m(X) = ? so that X = X 0, then the proof is done. Assume rst that M(X) 6= ?
and let t be a consequence inM(X). We have ftg  fxg for every x 2 X 0. We rst show that the
image ofX 0 under u, denoted u(X 0), is a set of real numbers that is bounded from above. That is,
there is a real number b such that u(x) b for all x 2 X 0. Suppose by way of contradiction that
u(X 0) is not bounded and consider, thanks to Proposition 7, consequences a, c0 and b 2 X 0 such
that fag  fc0g  fbg. By Averaging and transitivity, one has fag  fa; c0g  fc0g  fc0; bg
and, by Theorem 4, one has u(a) < u(c0)+u(b)2 () u(a) + u(a) < u(c0) + u(b). Since u(X 0) is
unbounded, there is a real number u02 u(X 0) such that u0 + u(a)  u(c0) + u(b). Since u0 2 X 0,
there is a c 2 X 0 such that u(c) = u0. By Theorem 4, one has fc; ag % fc0; bg  fc0; ag. If
follows from Richness that is some c1 such that fc1; ag  fc0; bg. Since fag  fbg, it follows
from Restricted Independence that fc1g  fc0g. This procedure, initiated by nding c0 and
c1, can clearly be iterated at innitum. It therefore generates a sequence ck, for k = 0; :::;
of consequences in X 0 such that fck; ag  fck 1; bg for k = 1; :::;. By assumption, ftg 
fckg for every k so that the sequence is bounded by t. Hence the fact that the sequence fckg
for k = 0; 1:::is innite contradicts the Archimedean axiom. Analogously, starting from the
assumption that m(X) 6= ;, one can deduce that u(X 0) is bounded from below. Since the set of
real numbers u(X 0) is either bounded from above and/or from below, it has a least upper bound
and/or a greatest lower bound. We therefore extend u to X by dening, for every t 2M(X) (if
any), u(t) = sup
x2X0
u(x) and, for every s 2 m(X) (if any), u(s) = inf
x2X0
u(x). We now show that u
extended in this fashion represents % as per (1) on the whole set X (and not only on X 0). By
denition u(t) > u(x) > u(s) for all t 2M(X), x 2 X 0and s 2 m(X), and u represents % as per
(1) on X 0 by Theorem 4. Take any x 2 X 0. By Certainty Equivalence, there are consequences
b and c 2 X such that fbg  fx; tg and fcg  fx; sg. By Averaging and transitivity, we have
fsg  fcg  fx; sg  fxg  fx; tg  fbg  ftg so that both b and c belong to X 0. We therefore
only need to show that u(x)+u(t)2 = u(b) and
u(x)+u(s)
2 = u(c). The argument being symmetric,
we only prove that u(x)+u(t)2 = u(b). By contradiction, suppose rst that
u(x)+u(t)
2 < u(b).
By Certainty Equivalence, there exists some b1 2 X such that fb1g  fx; bg. By Averaging
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fxg  fb1g  fbg and, therefore, b1 2 X 0. By Theorem 4, the statement fb1g  fx; bg can
be written as u(b1) =
u(x)+u(b)
2 . Dene recursively bn by fbng  fbn 1; bg for n = 2; :::.Since
ftg  fbg  fbng  fbn 1g by Averaging and transitivity, we have that b and bn 2 X 0 so that,










2n 1 u(b). Hence, for
n large enough, u(bn) 2]u(x)+u(t)2 ; u(b)[. Now, we know that fbg  fx; tg  fbng  fbn 1; xg.
By Richness, there exists t0 such that fx; t0g  fbng. Since fx; tg  fbng  fx; t0g, it follows
from Restricted Independence that ft0g  ftg. Hence x, bn and t0 2 X 0 so that, by Theorem 4,
u(t0)+u(x)
2 = u(bn) >
u(t)+u(x)




8.4 Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. We know from Proposition 2 that a UEU criterion satises Averaging and Restricted
Independence on any environment. Conversely, letX be a connected separable topological space
and let % be an ordering of P(X) satisfying the Continuity axiom as well as Averaging and
Restricted Independence. We will prove that, under these conditions, % satises Richness and
the Archimedean axiom. Using Theorems 2, 4 and 1, the conclusion that % is a UEU criterion
will then follow immediately. We rst notice that, under Averaging, if the sets B(A) = fx 2
X : fxg % Ag and W (A) = fx 2 X : A % fxgg are closed in X for every A, then so are the
sets eB(A) = fx 2 X : A [ fxg % Ag and fW (A) = fx 2 X : A % A [ fxgg. To see that, assume
by contraposition that, say, eB(A) is not closed (the argument for fW (A) is similar). Then, there
exists a sequence fxtg, t = 1; :::converging to some limit x such that:
A [ fxtg % A
for all t and
A  A [ fxg
where the last strict ranking is obtained from the assumption that % is complete. Since % is
also reexive, this strict ranking implies therefore that x =2 A. By Averaging one has therefore:
A  fxg (10)
Now, since A is nite, and fxtg is a sequence converging to x, either fxtg is a nite sequence
or fxtg is innite. If fxtg is nite, then, by denition, there exists some s  t for which
xs = x =2 X. But given Averaging, this is incompatible with the denition of the sequence fxtg
as satisfying A [ fxtg % A for every t. Hence we must conclude that xt is innite. If this is the
case, there must exists, since A is nite, an innite subsequence fextg of fxtg converging to x
and such that ext =2 A for every t. Since for every t, we have:
A [ fextg % A
it follows from Averaging that we also have:
fextg % A
Given (10), this gives us the required contradiction of the closedness of the set B(A). We now
prove that % satises Richness and the Archimedean axiom.
Richness: Consider any set B 2 P(X) and, without loss of generality, write it as B =
fb1; :::; b#Bg with fbhg - fbh+1g for h = 1; :::;#B   1. By Averaging (and specically the
Gardenförs principle) one has that B % fb1g and fb#Bg % B so that none of the (closed
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under Continuity) sets fx 2 X : fxg % Bg and fx 2 X : B % fxgg is empty. Since %
is complete, X = fx 2 X : fxg % Bg [ fx 2 X : B  fxgg. Since X is connected and
can therefore not be written as the union of two disjoint non-empty closed sets, there exists
x 2 fx 2 X : fxg % Bg \ fx 2 X : B  fxgg. By denition such a x satises fxg  B. Hence
% satises Certainty Equivalence. Consider now any sets A and B in P(X) and consequences
c and c 2 X such that A [ fcg % B % A [ fcg holds. Since, as was just shown, % sat-
ises Certainty Equivalence, there are consequences b and b(c) 2 X (for all c 2 X) such that
fb(c)g  A [ fcg and B  fbg. By Continuity, the restriction of the ordering % to singletons is
continuous. Hence, by Debreu [32] Theorem 1, there exists a continuous function f : X  ! R
such that f(x)  f(y) if and only if fxg % fyg for every x, y 2 X. Dene therefore the function
h : X ! R by h(c) = f(b(c)) f(b). We rst notice that the function h so dened is continuous
if f is. Indeed, suppose h is not continuous. This means that there exists a sequence fctg of
elements of X converging to some element c of X for which the sequence fh(ct)g of real numbers
does not converge to the number h(c) . The fact that sequence fh(ct)g does not converge to
h(c) means that there is some strictly positive number " for which it is the case that, for every
t0, there is some t00 > t0 for which one has:
jh(ct00)  h(c)j > "
()
jf(b(ct00))  f(b(c))j > " (11)
Consider now the open (in R) set A = fx 2 R : jx  f(b(c))j < "g. This set obviously contains
the number f(b(c)). Because f is a continuous function from X (a topological space) to R, the
inverse image f 1(A) = fc 2 X : jf(c)  f(b(c))j < "g is open and obviously contains c: Because
the sequence fctg converges to c, there exists a t0 such that ct00 2 f 1(A) for all t00 > t0. That
is, there exists a t0 such that jf(b(ct00))  f(b(c))j < " for all t00 > t0, contradicting (11). Hence
h is indeed a continuous function. By assumption, we have h(c)  0 and h(c)  0. Since X
is connected, we can appeal to the version of the Intermediate Value Theorem provided in [33]
(Proposition 8-11, p. 182) to exhibit a consequence c such that h(c) = f(b(c))   f(b) = 0. By
denition, c is such that A [ fcg  fbg  B, as required.
Archimedean axiom: If it is impossible to construct one of the standard sequences as in the
antecedent clause of the Archimedean axiom, then the proof is (trivially) over. Assume therefore
that such a sequence exists (we only provide the argument for the ascending sequence) and,
therefore, that a and b are two consequences in X satisfying fag  fbg for which one has, for a
sequence of consequences fctgt2N+ :
fct; ag  fct+1; bg: (12)
We notice that, by Restricted Independence, one has fct+1g  fctg for every t 2 N++. We
will show that if such a sequence is innite, then it is unbounded from above. For this task,
let Ct = fx 2 X : fxg  fctgg. By Continuity, Ct is open because it is the complement in
X (by completeness) of a closed set. Hence the set C =
S
t2N++ Ct is open and if z 2XnC,
then fzg % fctg for every t. We will show that the set XnC of upper bounds for the sequence
fctgt2N+ is empty. By contradiction, let z 2X=C. By Restricted Independence, one has (using
(12):
fz; ag  fz; bg % fct+1; bg  fct; ag
for every t. Since, as was proved above, Richness holds, there exists some w 2 X such that
fw; ag  fz; bg. By Restricted Independence, fzg  fwg and w 2 X=C because fwg % fctg for
all t. Now the set fv : fvg  fwgg is open by Continuity, contains z and is a subset of X=C
by transitivity. This means that that X=C is open because it is a union of open sets. But this
contradicts the assumption that X is connected and, as a result, can not be written as a union
of two disjoint open sets.
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if %1 and %2 are two orderings on P(X) that can
be represented as per (1) for some real-valued continuous functions u1 and u2 (having both X
as domain) such that u1(x) = 	(u2(x)) holds for every x 2 X for some continuous, increasing
and concave real valued function 	 having the image of R under u2 as domain, then %1 is at
least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as %2 as per Denition 1. Conversely, let %1 and %2
be two orderings on P(X) that can be represented as per (1) for the real-valued functions u1
and u2 having both X as domain and let %1 be at least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as %2
as per Denition 1. We rst notice if %1 is at least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as %2 as
per Denition 1, then %1 and %2 must provide the same ranking of singletons. Indeed, suppose
by contradiction that there are consequences x and y 2 X for which fxg %1 fyg holds but
fxg %2 fyg does not hold. Since %2is complete, one must have fyg 2 fxg and, since %1 is at
least as ambiguity/uncertainty averse as %2 as per Denition 1, one must have fyg 1 fxg, a
contradiction. Now, the functions u1 and u2 are both numerical representations of the orderings
of X induced by the restriction of %1 and %2 to singletons. Since these orderings are the same,
there must be some increasing real valued function 	 having the image of R under u2 as domain
for which u1(x) = 	(u2(x)) holds for every x 2 X. Moreover, 	 must be continuous if u1 and
u2 are continuous. We only need to show that 	 must be concave as well. By contradiction,
suppose it is not concave so that, for some a and b in the domain of 	 and some  2]0; 1[ for
which a + (1   )b is in the domain of 	, one has 	(a + (1   )b) < 	(a) + (1   )	(b).








Because a, b and a+b2 belong to the domain of 	 taken to be the image of X under u
2, there
are consequences x, y and z 2 X such that:
u2(x) = a; u2(y) =
a+ b
2
and u2(z) = b: (14)
Because the function u1 dened by u1(c) = 	(u2(c)) for every c 2 X represents the ordering
%1 as per (1), inequality (13) implies that:
fyg 1 fx; zg
On the other hand, the fact that the function u2 represents %2 as per (1) together with (14)
imply that:
y 2 fx; zg
in contradiction with the fact that %1 is at least as uncertainty/ambiguity averse as %2.
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